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VICTIMS IN THE CRIMINAL PROCESS: A UTILITARIAN




Crime victims are currently being given the right to participate in crimi-
nal prosecutions at both the sentencing' and plea bargaining stages. 2 These
are important steps in a criminal prosecution, but both the sentence and the
plea bargain are dependent on the initial charging decision which determines
what crime is to be prosecuted or whether there is to be any prosecution at
all. 3 As a prerequisite to both a plea bargain or a sentence, the charging
decision is the crux of the prosecution.
4
Given the importance of the charging decision, and the fact that some
jurisdictions have granted victims a right to participate in plea bargains and
sentencing, should victims also have a right to participate in the charging
decision? Although providing information to victims about the charging de-
cision has been endorsed, 5 there is resistance to victim participation in the
decision.6 This resistance to victim participation is implicit, 7 without expla-
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.A. 1974, University of Wisconsin;
J.D. 1978, University of Kentucky.
1. See, eg., CAL. CONsT. art. 1, § 28. See generally Mcleod, Victim Participation at Sentenc-
ing, 22 CRIM. L. BULL. 501, 507 & n.22 (1986). Cf Booth v. Maryland, 107 S. Ct. 2529 (1987)
(introduction of victim impact statement at sentencing phase of capital case violates the Eighth
Amendment).
2. See, eg., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611A.03(I) (West Supp. 1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-28-
3(14) (Supp. 1985).
3. The charging decision actually includes two discrete decisions: the decision whether to
prosecute the case at all and the decision of which offenses to charge. These decisions will be treated
together in this article because the law defining who makes these decisions and the law defining
within what constraints these decisions are made is the same, and for an analysis of victim participa-
tion there is no reason to distinguish these decisions.
4. See generally ABA STANDARDS ON THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION, Std. 3-3.9 commentary
(1971) ("The charging decision is the heart of the prosecution function."); Vorenberg, Decent Re-
straint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1524 (1981) ("The core of the prosecutor's
power is charging, plea bargaining, and.., initiating investigations.")
5. See, e.g., President's Task Force on Victims of Crime, Final Report, Prosecutors' Recom-
mendation 1 (1982).
6. See U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION, Part B ("Initiating
and Declining Prosecution") and Part C ("Selecting Charges") (1980): neither Part makes any refer-
ence to the victim; President's Task Force, supra note 5, which makes eight recommendations for
prosecutors and concludes only that prosecutors should keep victims informed of the charging deci-
sion; NAT'L JUDICIAL COLLEGE, CONFERENCE ON VICTIMS, PARTICIPANTS' MANUAL, Issue
II.B.(l) (the College considered the question, should the court consider a statement from the victim
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nation.8 While the resistance to the idea of victim participation may simply
be the product of a conservative bias against change, it is more likely born of
suspicion that the concern for victims' rights is a pretext to limit defendants'
rights and implement prosecution oriented changes in the system.9
This Article examines whether victims should be accorded a right to
participate formally in the charging decision. The perspective is primarily
utilitarian, the premise being that if victim participation is, on balance, use-
ful, there is no reason to reject it. The Article begins by assessing the costs
and benefits of victim participation in the charging decision. The first sec-
tion analyzes the parties' interests in the charging decision, and the impact
establishing a victim's participation right has on those interests. The second
section examines the current role of victims in the charging decision. The
third section analyzes the source of the charging decision, the prosecutor,
and limits on the prosecutor's discretion. The fourth section defines a
method of according victims a right to participate in the charging decision.
The Article concludes that victim participation in the charging decision can
be useful if the right to participate in the decisionmaking process is carefully
designed.
INTERESTS IN THE CHARGING DECISION AND THE IMPACT OF VICTIM
PARTICIPATION ON THOSE INTERESTS
The Victim's Interests
The victim's only direct interest in the substance of the charging deci-
sion is a feeling of catharsis or vindication when the defendant is charged
with a crime. Although victims may feel some vindication when the defend-
on a decision not to prosecute? The College's response to this question was apparently no, because
its final recommendations specifically endorsed victim participation in seven stages of the prosecu-
tion but omitted mention of victim participation at charging. The rationale for this omission is
revealed in a comment of the College following the question. The comment states: "The refusal of
the public prosecutor to pursue a given case is a matter of legitimate concern, but it does not seem to
be a problem that is susceptible of resolution by the court .... It would seem that his refusal to
properly discharge duties should be met with a political response."); ABA GUIDELINES FOR FAIR
TREATMENT OF VICTIMS AND WITNESSES (1984) (Guideline 10 states that victims "in serious cases
should have the opportunity to consult with the prosecutor prior to dismissal of the case.. . ." The
implication is that victims should be consulted regarding dismissal but not the original charging
decision.). With the possible exception of the National Judicial College, none of these positions
against victim participation was explicit.
Two commentators have reached the same conclusion. Professor Goldstein concludes that vic-
tims should not participate formally in the initial charging decision. Goldstein, Defining the Role of
the Victim in Criminal Prosecution, 52 Miss. L.J. 515 (1982). Professor Goldstein notes, however,
that informal participation remains available: "[T]here is nothing to prevent a prosecutor from rou-
tinely inviting the victim (and his counsel) to a pre-charge conference and soliciting his views on
what the charge should be." Id. at 557 n.88. Professor Hall has also considered this question. He
does not advocate a formal role for the victim at the charging stage, and notes that the decision to
prosecute should be influenced by the victim's attitudes only within guidelines promulgated to assure
fairness. Hall, The Role of the Victim in the Prosecution and Disposition of a Criminal Case, 28
VAND. L. REV. 931, 981-82 (1975).
7. See supra note 6.
8. The only exception to this dearth of explanation are the National Judicial College, see supra
note 6, and Professor Goldstein; the reason for Professor Goldstein's conclusion that victims should
not participate formally is apparently based on separation of powers concerns. Goldstein, supra note
6, at 553 n.76 & 557 n.88.
9. See Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim's Rights, 37 STAN. L. REV. 937 (1985).
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ant is charged, from the system's perspective, this feeling is unjustified be-
cause, until conviction, the defendant is presumed to be inrpocent. Aside
from this feeling of vindication, the victim has no interest in the charging
decision, per se; whether an action is filed and selection of the charges are
decisions with no direct impact on the victim.
But the victim does have an indirect interest in the charging decision
because the conviction and sentence are dependent upon the charging deci-
sion, and victims have significant interests in the conviction and sentence.
With regard to sentencing, the victim has a financial interest because restitu-
tion is usually a possibility.' 0 Another interest in the sentence is psychologi-
cal. The victim may desire retribution in the form of a severe sentence."
The victim may also wish to incapacitate the defendant: if the sentence in-
cludes incarceration, the defendant will no longer be a threat to the victim.
With regard to the conviction, the victim's interests are twofold. First, the
conviction sets limits on the potential sentence and therefore implicates the
victim's sentencing interests. Second, the conviction decision itself carries a
symbolic significance for the victim because it is society's judgment that the
person who harmed the victim is criminal. Thus the victim has an indirect
interest in the substance of the charging decision because it affects both the
conviction and sentencing decisions. 12
These indirect interests in the charging decision are somewhat suscepti-
ble to alternative protection by victim participation at later stages. How-
ever, such later participation is not complete protection because the victim's
interests in the conviction and sentencing stages may already have been com-
promised or foreclosed by the charging decision.
Analysis of the victim's interests in the substance of the charging deci-
sion indicates that these interests are best served when the defendant is pros-
ecuted on the most serious charges. 13 Serious charges are themselves the
most rewarding symbolically, and serious charges allow a serious conviction
and sentence, which is again rewarding symbolically. Moreover, the more
serious the charges, the greater is the possibility that the sentence will satisfy
the victim's interests in restitution, retribution and incapacitation.
Aside from the substance of the charging decision, the victim also has
an interest in the process by which the charging decision is made. A victim
who is consulted regarding the charges, and who feels like an important par-
ticipant in the process of reaching a charging decision, will likely feel better
10. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3579(a)(2) (1982). See generally Anderson & Woodard, Victim and
Witness Assistance: New State Laws and the System's Response, 68 JUD. 221, 226-27 (1985).
11. See, eg., Davis, Kunreuther & Connick, Expanding the Victim's Role in the Criminal Court
Disposition Process: The Results of an Experiment, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 491, 500 (1984)
("Failure of the court to punish defendants severely enough was the most frequently cited reason for
dissatisfaction with case outcomes, mentioned by 70% of victims.").
12. Cf President's Task Force, supra note 5, Recommendation 1, commentary ("The victim,
not the state, is directly aggrieved by violent crime, and has an unquestionably valid interest in the
prosecution his complaint initiates.").
13. Of course, this assumes that the victim wants a prosecution to proceed. This assumption is
reasonable because pursuing a prosecution is most consistent with the victim's interests. However,
some victims may prefer to avoid the possible trauma or inconvenience of a trial. These victims are
often in a position to stop the prosecution simply by refusing to cooperate. See Hall, supra note 6, at
970.
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served by the criminal justice system than one who is excluded from the
process and treated as irrelevant.
14
Victim participation at the charging stage allows the victim an opportu-
nity to protect victim interests. First, the victim could encourage the prose-
cutor to pursue the case and to file the most serious charges justified, thereby
serving the victim's interests in the substance of the decision as described
above. Second, regardless of how the decision is resolved, the victim may
feel less alienated for having played a role in the decision making process.
The Defendants' Rights and Interests
a. Rights
Defendants have few rights in the charging decision. They have the
right to challenge the charging decision as unsupported by sufficient evi-
dence, 15 as unconstitutional if retaliatory 16 or discriminatory, 17 and, as some
cases suggest, as unethical if not made in good faith or not based upon ap-
propriate charging considerations.' 8
Victim participation in the charging decision would not violate any of
these rights because only the prosecutor, as the exclusive source of charg-
ing, 19 has the power to violate the rights of the defendant with regard to
charging. Yet the question remains whether victim participation in the
charging decision would render violations of these rights by the prosecutor
more likely. As to the defendant's right to have the charges supported by
sufficient evidence, victim participation in the charging decision might lead
to more charges being filed that are not supported by sufficient evidence.
Assuming that victims will generally encourage the prosecutor to file the
most severe charges possible, 20 prosecutors may respond to victims' urgings
by filing aggressively in cases where the evidence is marginal. However, the
defendant's rights would not be impaired because the prosecutor's charging
decision is routinely screened for sufficiency of the evidence by a grand jury
or in a preliminary hearing.21 Thus the charging decision is checked for
sufficiency of the evidence as a matter of course, and the defendant's rights
would always be protected.
Victim participation would not render the prosecutor's charging deci-
14. Cf NAT'L JUDICIAL COLLEGE, supra note 6, Issue II.B.(7), Background ("Victims are very
disturbed by plea negotiations in which the prosecutor and defense counsel take it upon themselves
to compromise the case against the defendant, sometimes in flagrant disregard of the facts of the
seriousness of the crime as perceived by the victim."); Davis, Kunreuther & Connick, supra note 11,
at 492-93 ("Victims may become frustrated and angry when they see that an assault against them
may be treated only as disorderly conduct, that prosecutor and defense attorney appear to collabo-
rate rather than act as adversaries, that their cases receive only a few minutes of the court's time, or
that after pleading guilty, the defendant may be home before they are.").
15. See infra notes 148-55 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 163-66 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 156-63 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 167-70. This right is not well defined and has resulted in no dismissals of
charges.
19. See infra texi accompanying note 127.
20. Analysis of the victim's interests indicates that the victim's interest is to endorse filing of the
most serious and most numerous charges. See supra text accompanying note 13. Therefore, it is a
reasonable assumption that most victims will seek the most serious and numerous charges.
21. See infra notes 149-52 and accompanying text.
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sion more likely unconstitutional as retaliatory or discriminatory. Victim
input into the charging decision would be unrelated to the likelihood of the
prosecutor retaliating against the defendant for exercising his or her rights.
2 2
Likewise, victim input would have no tendency to encourage the prosecutor
to rely on criteria that are discriminatory under the equal protection clause.
With regard to the defendant's right that the charging decision be made
ethically and in good faith, assessment of the impact of victim participation
is more difficult. First, the right exists only as dicta in a few cases and is so
ill-defined that a meaningful analysis is problematical. 2 3 The case that most
specifically defines this right 24 relies on DR 7-105 of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct which provides that it is unethical to threaten criminal
action in order to procure advantage in a civil case.25 Victim participation
in the charging decision would not make the prosecutor more likely to
threaten criminal action to procure a civil advantage. If the prosecutor is in
a position to gain a civil advantage by threatening criminal charges, that
situation will exist regardless of whether the victim has a right to participate
in the charging decision.26 Thus, the impact of victim participation will be
neutral and would not encourage the prosecutor to make charging decisions
in bad faith. Accordingly, victim participation in the charging decision
would neither violate the defendant's rights directly, nor make violation of
those rights by the prosecutor more likely. Although victim participation in
the charging decision would not interfere with any of the defendant's rights,
it would almost certainly interfere with the defendant's interests.
b. Interests
The defendant's main interest in the charging decision is to convince the
prosecutor to adopt a non-criminal disposition of the case2 7 or, failing that,
to encourage the prosecutor to minimize the charges in order to limit the
possible sentences. To accomplish these goals, the defendant's interest is in
minimizing the incriminating information available to the prosecutor and in
ensuring that the prosecutor has all the exculpatory and mitigating informa-
tion. These are, of course, just interests and not rights: the defendant has no
right to minimize the incriminating information to which the prosecutor is
exposed; nor does the defendant have a right to present exculpatory or miti-
gating information to the prosecutor.
The impact of victim participation on the defendant's interests will be
harmful if the victim provides incriminating information to the prosecutor
22. See infra text accompanying notes 163-66.
23. See infra notes 167-70 and accompanying text.
24. MacDonald v. Musick, 425 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1970), discussed infra note 167.
25. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY D.R. 7-105 (1982).
26. In this kind of conflict the prosecutor has always had the discretion to allow the victim to
participate; the only question is whether the victim should have a right to participate. Practically,
the question will only arise when the prosecutor tries to file charges without consulting the victim.
At any rate, as to this right to have the charging decision made ethically and in good faith, it
cannot be presumed that information supplied by the victim would necessarily constitute the "con-
taminating influence," Sinclair v. State, 363 A.2d 468, 478 (Md. 1976), of which courts are wary.
27. One common type of non-criminal disposition is pretrial diversion. See generally Y.
KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 881-82 (6th ed. 1986).
19881
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but the defendant's interest in minimizing the incriminating information
provided to the prosecutor is not an interest worthy of protection. It is bad
policy to limit the information available to the prosecutor; theoretically,
more information provided to a decision maker results in a better decision.
The defendant should not be permitted to preclude the victim from consult-
ing with the prosecutor simply because the victim may provide incriminating
information.
28
A victim has no power to prevent a defendant from presenting exculpa-
tory information. Thus, a defendant's interest in presenting exculpatory in-
formation will not be affected by victim participation.
Beyond the victim and the defendant, the prosecutor and society also
have an interest in the charging decision. Their interests often overlap be-
cause the prosecutor's formal role is to represent society.29 Yet, because at
other times their interests are distinct,30 the discussion below examines the
interests of the prosecutor and of society separately.
31
The Prosecutor's Interests
The prosecutor's principal interest in the substance of the charging de-
cision is to file the broadest, the most serious, and the greatest number of
charges that are supported by the evidence.32 Such overcharging benefits the
prosecutor in two ways. First, because it exerts pressure on the defendant to
enter a plea bargain and thereby not risk conviction at trial on all the
charges, overcharging helps the prosecutor achieve favorable and speedy dis-
position of a large volume of cases. Second, overcharging allows the prose-
cutor to maximize flexibility in plea bargaining or in proving the charges at
trial since it preserves the broadest range of possible convictions.
33
The prosecutor's secondary interest in the charging decision is not in
the substance of the decision but in the process by which it is made. This
interest is to make the decision as quickly as possible. Prosecutors generally
work with small budgets and heavy caseloads. Time is at a premium, so
prosecutors are not free to allocate excessive time to reviewing files and de-
28. The prosecutor has always had the discretion to allow the victim to express an opinion, so
the question only arises where the prosecutor is resistant to victim consultation. Assuming the pros-
ecutor is resistant but the victim wants to express his or her views on the charging decision, the
defendant's interest in limiting the incriminating information given to the prosecutor should not be
the factor to tip the balance and deny the victim the right to consult with the prosecutor.
29. See United States v. Bess, 593 F.2d 749 (6th Cir. 1979); ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO
PLEAS OF GUILTY, Std. 14-3. l(d), Commentary (1971) ("The duty of the prosecutor is to act in the
best interests of society at large .. "); Abrahamson, Redefining Roles: The Victims' Rights Move-
ment, 1983 UTAH L. REV. 517, 537; Budewitz, State Legislation in Aid of Victims and Witnesses of
Crime, 10 J. LEGis. 394, 395-96 (1983); Henderson, supra note 9, at 980-81.
30. See United States v. LeFevre, 483 F.2d 477 (3d Cir. 1973); Gittler, Expanding the Role of
the Victim in a Criminal Action, 11 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 117, 144-45 (1984) (if conflict arises be-
tween society's interests and the victim's interests, prosecutor must give priority to society's inter-
ests); Goldstein, supra note 6, at 555; McDonald, Towards a Bicentennial Revolution in Criminal
Justice, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 649, 650 (1976).
31. The prosecutor has many interests which are consistent with those of society or the victim.
The interests discussed below are not exhaustive of the prosecutor's interests, and the discussion is
not meant to imply that the prosecutor is not interested in restitution, retribution or incapacitation.
32. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 6, at Part C ("Selecting Charges").
33. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION, Std. 3-3.9 (1971).
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bating charging decisions. For the same reasons, the prosecutor's interest is
to make the charging decision without time consuming interference from
others.
As to the prosecutor's interest that the charges filed be the broadest and
most serious supported by the evidence, the impact of victim participation
would be minimal. The victim's interests indicate that the victim will also
generally seek to have the most serious charges filed. 34 Thus, the prosecutor
and the victim have the same interest in the substance of the charges, albeit
for different reasons.35 Because victims and prosecutors have consistent in-
terests at the charging stage, the impact of victim participation on the sub-
stance of the prosecutor's decision would be negligible.
36
Regarding the process of reaching the charging decision, the interests of
the prosecutor and victim diverge. The prosecutor wants the simplest pro-
cess to achieve the quickest decision. Of course, the amount of additional
time consumed by victim participation would depend on the type of partici-
pation right defined, but there will inevitably be some impact. On this point,
victim participation conflicts with the interest of the prosecutor. From the
prosecutor's perspective, victim participation would be benign as to the sub-
stance of the charging decision, but would entail some costs for the process
of making the decision.
It must be recalled that the prosecutor is always free to allow the victim
to participate if the prosecutor chooses. The only situation where a victim's
right to participate would have any practical impact is where the prosecutor
wants to make the charging decision without consulting the victim. Thus,
the only situations changed by granting victims a participation right are
those in which the prosecutor is resistant to victim participation, otherwise
the victim would already have been consulted.
Society's Interests
Society has numerous interests in the substance of the charging deci-
sion. Society's primary interest is that charging decisions be consistent and
fair, not arbitrary, and not based upon inappropriate factors. 37 A second
interest is that the charging decision implement society's enforcement priori-
ties.38 A third interest is that the charging power be used wisely to allocate
scarce resources, so the limited funds available are used efficiently and the
decisions are economically rational.39 Another societal interest is that the
34. See supra text accompanying note 13.
35. This difference in reasons results in a divergence of interests at the conviction stage. For
example, where a guilty plea based on a plea bargain is contemplated, the prosecutor can be expected
to endorse the plea bargain to save time and avoid risk, whereas victims do not have the same
concerns and might prefer to pursue the most serious conviction and sentence possible regardless of
the time commitment.
36. Victim participation might even benefit the prosecutor in that it would encourage the victim
to become involved in the prosecution. Of course, the prosecutor who wants to involve the victim in
the prosecution has always had the discretion to do so.
37. See Goldstein, supra note 6, at 554-55; Hall, supra note 6, at 982.
38. See, ag., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL PRIORITIES FOR THE INVESTIGATION AND
PROSECtrrON OF WHITE COLLAR CRIMES (1980).
39. This societal interest in securing maximum returns for each dollar spent is another expres-
sion of the prosecutor's interest in making the decision quickly and therefore cheaply.
1988]
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charging power be used to file test cases and make new law;40 such test cases
ensure the creative evolution of common law to reflect the state's needs. Fi-
nally, if the charges filed are novel and generate publicity, the mere filing of
charges, even without a conviction, may have a deterrent effect on crime.
41
Victim participation would not infringe directly on the societal interests
in the substance of the decision because the prosecutor would remain the
exclusive source of the charging decision. However, a different question is
whether victim participation would make the prosecutor less likely to serve
society's interests effectively. The answer depends, to some extent, on the
individual prosecutor; but discounting individual variations, any possible
systemic impact must be considered. Victim participation may affect soci-
ety's interest that the charging decisions be fair and consistent. Victim par-
ticipation would introduce into the charging decision a new variable, the
victim, who has the potential for causing more variation in charging deci-
sions.42 Victims will presumably represent a range of enthusiasm for assert-
ing a participation right. The result may be that insistent victims encourage
prosecution whereas silent or affirmatively reluctant victims will discourage
it.43 As for the other interests of society mentioned above, there is no reason
to conclude that victim participation would have a detrimental impact; vic-
tim participation is irrelevant to society's other interests.
The process of making the charging decision should be simple and
quick. As the prosecutor's client, society loses if the prosecutor has to spend
more time reaching a charging decision.
Victim participation in the charging decision would also introduce two
benefits for society independent of the interests examined above. First, vic-
tim participation would allow victims to feel important. As noted above,
this is good for victims, but it is also good for society. If victims feel irrele-
vant and alienated, they may not cooperate in reporting and prosecuting
crime, and the system, which is dependent on citizen participation, would
function less effectively as a result.44 Second, victim participation might bol-
40. See, eg., People v. Warner-Lambert, Inc., 51 N.Y.2d 295, 434 N.Y.S.2d 159 (Ct. App.
1980).
41. For example, in the recent prosecution of director John Landis and others in California for
manslaughter in connection with the filming of "The Twilight Zone," the jury returned a verdict of
not guilty. Prosecutor D'Agostino's reaction was, "[But] if we have succeeded in saving one life and
deterring one director... the prosecution was successful." Lexington Herald-Leader, June 30, 1987,
at AS.
42. Hall, supra note 6, at 981. Cf Booth v. Maryland, 107 S. Ct. 2529, 2533-34 (1987) (ability
of victims to be articulate and persuasive in expressing their grief is dangerous for jury to consider in
death penalty cases).
43. The Court's reliance on the alleged arbitrariness that can result from the differing abil-
ity of victims' families to articulate their sense of loss is a makeweight consideration: No
two prosecutors have exactly the same ability to present their arguments to the jury; no
two witnesses have exactly the same ability to communicate the facts; but there is no re-
quirement in capital cases that the evidence and argument be reduced to the lowest com-
mon denominator.
Booth, 107 S. Ct. at 2540-41.
44. Congress has stated, "The Congress finds and declares that... without the cooperation of
victims .... the criminal justice system would cease to function .. "; 18 U.S.C. § 1501 (1982); W.
VA. CODE § 61-1 lA-1 (Supp. 1985) (identical legislative finding); Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Joy, 283
Md. 205, 215, 389 A.2d 874, 880 (Ct. App. 1978) (prosecutor is "bound to recognize, in exercising
his prosecutorial discretion, that in our present day society no prosecutor can meet his responsibili-
ties to the public without the cooperation and support of private citizens."). But see Gittler, supra
[Vol. 30
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ster public confidence, for even if the victim did not agree with the final
charging decision, the public would know that the victim had been consulted
and given a chance to express his or her view. Thus, participation might
give the charging decision more legitimacy in the public's perception, and
society might feel more confidence in charging decisions.
Summarizing the Costs and Benefits
The victim's interests in the substance of the charging decision are sec-
ondary. The vindication the victim might feel as a result of charges being
filed should probably not be encouraged as a policy matter because it con-
flicts with the presumption of innocence. The victim's other interests in the
substance of the charging decision are indirect: they exist only by reference
to the conviction and sentencing stages. These interests are partially pro-
tected by participation at these later stages. Both the victim and the prose-
cutor favor filing serious charges, and the victim's interest is protected
because it is consistent with that of the prosecutor.
Thus, the victim's interest in the substance of the charging decision is
susceptible to partial alternative protection, and is already represented by
the prosecutor. Yet there remains the victim's interest in the process by
which the decision is made. For the victim, participation in the process,
regardless of the result, may be beneficial in that the victim will more likely
be satisfied with his role in the decision. This interest in the process by
which the decision is made is not objectionable as a policy matter, nor is it
otherwise protected.
From the defendant's perspective, no rights are violated by victim par-
ticipation. The defendant's interest in minimizing the incriminating infor-
mation provided to the prosecutor, while impaired by victim participation, is
not worthy of protection. The defendant's interest in providing exculpatory
information to the prosecutor is not affected because the defendant is still
free to do so at the prosecutor's discretion. Therefore, no persuasive reason
exists from defendants' perspective to deny victims a participation right.
The prosecutor has two main interests in the charging decision: filing
the most serious and the greatest number of charges, and using the quickest,
simplest decisional process. On the substance of the charging decision, the
victim's interests are consistent with the prosecutor's interests, so victim par-
ticipation would be no drawback from the prosecutor's perspective. But the
time consumed by the victim's right to participate would interfere with the
prosecutor's interest in a speedy, streamlined process. Therefore, victim par-
ticipation, while not detrimental to the substance of the charging decision,
would be detrimental to the decision-making process because of the addi-
tional time consumed.
From society's perspective, victim participation could have two nega-
tive impacts. Charging decisions may be increasingly inconsistent and the
note 30, at 145-49. Gittler concludes that, "The available data ... is [sic] not really sufficient to
reach any definite conclusion about the causal links, if any, between victim non-cooperation in the
prosecution of alleged offenders, victim dissatisfaction with the criminal justice system, and victim
participation in criminal proceedings." Id. at 149.]
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process of making the charging decision may become more complicated and
time-consuming. However, the process of victim participation will also gen-
erate two benefits: the function of the criminal justice system will be fostered
because participation minimizes victim alienation, and public confidence in
the system will be bolstered by knowledge of victim consultation regarding
any charges filed or not filed.
The case for victim participation in the charging decision is not conclu-
sive. Such participation has drawbacks. Whether the benefits of victim par-
ticipation would outweigh the detriments depends on the type of
participation right established.
CURRENT STATUS OF VICTIMS IN THE CHARGING DECISION
Victims currently play no formal role45 in the charging decision. 46 Stat-
utes authorizing prosecution make no mention of victims,47 nor do internal
45. Of course, the extent to which the victim participates informally in the charging decision is
a different question. Individual prosecutors vary in their willingness to defer to victims' preferences.
While it is difficult to identify the informal and often unarticulated practices of prosecutors on this
issue, Professor Hall has conducted a study of prosecutors in Nashville, Tennessee which indicated
that victims seeking prosecution were influential on the decision to charge in serious felony cases but
had relatively little influence in nonserious cases, while victims opposing prosecution were not influ-
ential on serious felonies (except rape) but were generally heeded in nonserious cases. Hall, supra
note 6, at 946-53.
A recent survey of prosecutors in Kentucky indicates the informal influence of victims on prose-
cutors' charging decisions: 70% of prosecutors reported that victims encouraging prosecution af-
fected their decision to file charges, and 100% of prosecutors reported that victims discouraging
prosecution affected their decision to file charges. Only 14% reported that victims had no effect.
S.D. ARNOLD, THE RIGHTS OF THE VICTIM IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 12 (unpublished
manuscript on file with the ARIZONA LAW REVIEW).
Other recognition of informal victim participation includes the ABA STANDARDS ON THE
PROSECtrrION FUNCTION, Std. 3-3.9(b)(v) (1971) (reluctance of victim to testify is factor to consider
in declining prosecution); Note, Prosecutorial Discretion in the Initiation of Criminal Complaints, 42
So. CAL. L. REv. 519, 530 (victim status as subjective variable in decision to prosecute) (victim
approach of prosecutor's supervisor as affecting decision to prosecute) (1969). But see Goldstein,
supra note 6, at 527 (views of victim rarely solicited, much less attended to; "[P]rosecutors... [are]
inattentive to the victim's preferences about critical decisions to be made, including the decision on
charges to be brought .. "); Thomas & Fitch, Prosecutorial Decision Making, 13 AM. CRIM. L.
REv. 507, 513-14 (1976), where the authors list 11 factors which studies have shown influence prose-
cutors' charging decision, and the preference of the victim is not among the factors listed.
One interesting type of informal victim input into the charging decision arose in Common-
wealth v. Dunlap, 474 Pa. 155, 377 A.2d 975 (1977), where the prosecutor also represented the
victim in a civil action arising out of the same facts as the criminal action. The victim's relationship
as the prosecutor's client would likely encourage the prosecutor to file criminal charges, and to file
the most serious ones, to procure an advantage in the civil action. See id. at 978 (Roberts, J., dissent-
ing and quoting the dissenting opinion of Hoffman, J., from Commonwealth v. Dunlap, 233 Pa.
Super. 38, 46, 335 A.2d 364, 368 (1975): "[A]n attorney would be hard-pressed to abandon prosecu-
tion of a defendant when a criminal conviction would be proof of the alleged tort in the civil
suit ... ").
46. See Goldstein, supra note 6, at 548:
The victim's complaint may give rise to the prosecution and his testimony may be essential
to sustain it, but he has no formal relation to the criminal case. The prosecutor alone is
said to represent the public interest in criminal law. He has been endowed by the courts
with a broad and virtually unreviewable discretion in these matters of charging and dismis-
sal.... Id.
See generally McDonald, supra note 30, at 651-61 (chronicles the historical decline of the vic-
tim's role in criminal prosecutions).
47. See statutes cited infra notes 128-31.
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guidelines issued by the executive branch.48 When victims have resorted to
the courts to challenge the prosecutor's charging decision, they have re-
ceived no relief. Reasons for the courts' rejection of victim participation are
examined below.
The Courts' Reluctance to Review Charging Decisions
Victims have been denied relief because of the courts' traditional reluc-
tance to review prosecutors' charging decisions, 49 a reluctance which is fre-
quently expressed in strong terms.50 The reason generally cited by the
courts for their refusal to review the charging decision is that review would
be unconstitutional under the separation of powers doctrine. 5 1 The prosecu-
48. See, eg., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 6, Part B, Initiating and Declining Prosecution
(lists considerations for declining prosecution and makes no mention of victim); and Part C, Select-
ing Charges (lists considerations in selecting charges and makes no mention of victim). Cf. Presi-
dent's Task Force, supra note 5, Prosecutors' Recommendation 1.
49. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985) (describing courts as "properly hesi-
tant to examine the decision whether to prosecute"); Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v.
Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1975) (discussion of courts' reluctance to review charging deci-
sions); Spillman v. United States, 413 F.2d 527, 530 (9th Cir. 1969) (court "cannot inquire into the
motives of the United States Attorney for prosecuting this appellant"); Newman v. United States,
362 F.2d 479, 480 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Ray v. Department of Justice, 508 F. Supp. 724, 725 (E.D. Mo.
1981); Pugach v. Klein, 193 F. Supp. 630, 634 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Vorenberg, supra note 4, at 1546
(discussing the "hands-off approach of the courts").
50. See, eg., Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607 (decision to prosecute is "particularly ill-suited" to judicial
review); Newman, 382 F.2d at 480 ("Few subjects are less adapted to judicial review than the exer-
cise by the Executive of his discretion in deciding when and whether to institute criminal proceed-
ings, or what precise charge shall be made .. "); Ray, 508 F. Supp. at 725 ("well-settled" that
initiation of federal criminal prosecution is discretionary decision with Executive Branch "not sub-
ject to judicial compulsion"); New York v. Muka, 440 F. Supp. 33, 36 (N.D.N.Y. 1977) (U.S. Attor-
ney possesses "an absolute and unreviewable discretion as to what crimes to prosecute"); Pugach,
193 F. Supp. at 634 ("lIt is ... clear beyond question that it is not the business of the Courts to tell
the U.S. Attorney to perform what they conceive to be his duties.").
Some courts have gone so far as to characterize the prosecutor's charging discretion as unre-
viewable. See, eg., United States v. Kysar, 459 F.2d 422, 424 (10th Cir. 1972) ("[U.S. Attorney] has
the power to prosecute or not to prosecute; this decision is not reviewable by any court."); Muka,
440 F. Supp. at 36 (U.S. Attorney possesses "absolute and unreviewable discretion as to what crimes
to prosecute"). This language is hyperbole. Courts are reluctant to review the prosecutor's charging
decision, see supra note 49, but there are situations when courts will do so, see infra text accompany-
ing notes 148-71. Thus it is inaccurate to label the prosecutor's charging discretion as unreviewable.
The courts' use of this term does, however, indicate the breadth of the prosecutor's charging discre-
tion and the courts' reluctance to review that discretion.
51. See, eg., United States v. Greene, 697 F.2d 1229, 1235 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v.
Torquato, 602 F.2d 564, 569 (3d Cir. 1979) ("The concept of separation of powers underlies the
courts' concern that the prosecutorial function be relatively untrammeled."); United States v. John-
son, 577 F.2d 1304, 1307 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504, 512-15 (5th Cir.
1975); Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 379 (2d Cir. 1973) ("The
primary ground upon which this traditional judicial aversion to compelling prosecutions has been
based is the separation of powers doctrine."); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir.) (en
banc); Pugach, 193 F. Supp. at 634.
State courts also recognize the separation of powers concern. See, eg., People v. Baron, 130 Il.
App. 588, 591, 264 N.E.2d 423, 425-26 (1970), where the court stated:
Article III of the Illinois Constitution divides the powers of the government among the
legislative, executive and judicial departments, and provides that neither of these depart-
ments shall exercise powers belonging to either of the other departments.
The State's Attorney's office is a part of the executive branch of the government, and
the powers exercised by that office are executive powers. A judge or court cannot exercise
the powers of the executive branch of our government .... Thus, the court erred in
designating the felony charge as a misdemeanor and in treating it as such. This order was
void as a judicial encroachment upon the executive power of the State's Attorney.
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tor is part of the executive branch, and the judiciary feels constrained to
resist interfering with the executive's charging discretion, 52 at least when the
decision is not unconstitutional, unethical, or based on insufficient
evidence.
5 3
Although courts usually rely on the separation of powers principle, they
have occasionally cited other reasons for their refusal to review prosecutors'
charging decisions. One reason is that the extreme breadth of the prosecu-
tor's charging discretion is desirable to preserve flexibility.54 The theory is
that the prosecutor needs significant flexibility to react to all the diverse cir-
cumstances involved in the alleged commission of a crime.55 Specifically, a
prosecutor needs the freedom to screen out weak cases56 and to use common
sense when making the charging decision.57 So the prosecutor, who neces-
sarily works with limited resources,5 8 must be accorded wide charging dis-
cretion in order to achieve individualized, and therefore more responsive and
effective, justice.
59
Recently the U.S. Supreme Court endorsed the courts' reluctance to
review prosecutors' charging decisions and described additional reasons to
decline such review.60 The Court characterized the decision to prosecute as
"particularly ill-suited to judicial review" because the factors the prosecutor
considers in deciding to file charges are not susceptible to the kind of analy-
See also Hoines v. Barney's Club, Inc., 28 Cal. 3d 603, 611, 620 P.2d 628, 633, 170 Cal. Rptr. 42, 47
(1980) (relying on separation of powers doctrine as basis for interpretation of statute which leaves
judgment of whether to prosecute with prosecutor); People ex rel. Leonard v. Papp, 386 Mich. 672,
194 N.W.2d 673 (1972).
On the separation of powers principle as the basis for the courts' refusal to review charging
discretion, see generally Vorenberg, supra note 4, at 1546-47; Note, Reviewability of Prosecutorial
Discretion: Failure to Prosecute, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 130, 136-38 (1975).
52. The courts' commitment to the separation of powers principle is reflected in the firm lan-
guage they use. See Johnson, 577 F.2d at 1307 ("The doctrine of separation of powers, inherent in
our tripartite constitutional scheme of government, prohibits free judicial interference with the exer-
cise of the discretionary powers of the attorneys of the United States over criminal prosecutions.")
(citations omitted); Cox, 342 F.2d at 171 ("[A]s an incident of the constitutional separation of pow-
ers, the courts are not to interfere with the free exercise of the discretionary powers of the attorney of
the United States .. "); United States v. Ahmad, 347 F. Supp. 912, 927 (M.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd, 482
F.2d 171 (3rd Cir. 1973) ("[I]n compliance with the doctrine of separation of powers, the judiciary is
not to become the overseer of the executive in the exercise of its discretion in the prosecution of
criminal cases"); Papp, 386 Mich. at 684, 194 N.W.2d at 699 ("For the judiciary to claim power to
control the institution and conduct of prosecutions would be an intrusion on the power of the execu-
tive branch of government and a violation of the constitutional separation of powers.").
53. See infra text accompanying notes 148-70.
54. See Spillman, 413 F.2d at 530 ("The United States Attorney must be given wide latitude in
order to effectively enforce the federal criminal laws."); United States v. Shober, 489 F. Supp. 393,
405 (E.D. Pa. 1979); People v. Gallegos, 644 P.2d 920, 930-31 (Colo. 1982); see generally ABA
STANDARDS ON THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION, Std. 3-3.9 Commentary (1971); Breitel, Control in
Criminal Law Enforcement, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 427, 428-35 (1960).
55. See Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 UCLA L.
REv. 1, 3 (1971) ("The need for discretion arises in part because of the difficulty of encompassing
within necessarily general rules the myriad circumstances that may be deemed relevant to a pending
decision.").
56. Vorenberg, supra note 4, at 1547-48.
57. Id. at 1551-52.
58. Id at 1548-49. See also infra note 141.
59. See LaFave, The Prosecutor's Discretion in the United States, 18 AM. J. CoMp. L. 532, 533-
49 (1970) (reasons for charging discretion include limitations in available enforcement resources, and
the need to individualize justice); Note, supra note 51, at 144.
60. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985).
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ses courts make. 61 The Court also noted that judicial supervision would en-
tail "systemic costs" because the supervision would cause delay, have a
chilling effect on law enforcement, and would undermine prosecutorial effec-
tiveness by revealing enforcement policy.
62
Other reasons have been cited by the courts in support of their reluc-
tance to review charging decisions. These reasons include the lack of any
record of how the charging decision was made,6 3 the lack of any defined
standards to apply in the review process,6 and the necessity of secrecy to
protect the potential defendant.
65
61. Id.
62. Id. This last factor has been called "unearned deterrence" by Professor Vorenberg. Voren-
berg, supra note 4, at 1549-51. See also Note, supra note 51, at 141.
This discussion of reasons to decline judicial review omits mention of the constitutional re-
straint-the separation of powers doctrine. This omission is unusual since most courts rely on this
restraint to decline review of the charging decision. See supra note 51. As Professor Vorenberg
noted with prescience four years before Wayte was written, "The hands-off approach of the courts
seems to reflect their view, based on the other arguments [outlined herein] rather than on constitu-
tional restraints, that it would be unwise to interfere with prosecutors' ability to manage the business
of criminal justice." Vorenberg, supra note 4, at 1546.
63. See Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 380 (2d Cir.
1973):
In the normal case of review of executive acts of discretion, the administrative record is
open, public and reviewable on the basis of what it contains. The decision not to prosecute,
on the other hand, may be based upon the insufficiency of the available evidence, in which
event the secrecy of the grand jury and of the prosecutor's file may serve to protect the
accused's reputation from public damage based upon insufficient, improper, or even mali-
cious charges. In camera review would not be meaningful without access by the com-
plaining party to the evidence before the grand jury or U.S. Attorney. Such interference
with the normal operations of criminal investigations, in turn, based solely upon allegations
of criminal conduct, raises serious questions of potential abuse by persons seeking to have
other persons prosecuted. Any person, merely by filing a complaint containing allegations
in general terms (permitted by the Federal Rules) of unlawful failure to prosecute, could
gain access to the prosecutor's fie and the grand jury's minutes, notwithstanding the se-
crecy normally attaching to the latter by law. See Rule 6(e), F.R.Cr.P.
See generally Vorenberg, supra note 4, at 1568 (lack of general rules or record of action as "most
important" explanation for courts' reluctance to oversee prosecutors' decisions); Note, supra note 51,
at 139-40 ("A persistent, although not insurmountable, technical barrier to review of decisions not to
prosecute is the difficulty courts have in ascertaining the basis of the prosecutorial decision.").
64. See Rockefeller, 477 F.2d at 380:
Nor is it clear what the judiciary's role of supervision should be were it to undertake
such a review. At what point would the prosecutor be entitled to call a halt to further
investigation as unlikely to be productive? What evidentiary standard would be used to
decide whether prosecution should be compelled? How much judgment would the United
States Attorney be allowed? Would he be permitted to limit himself to a strong "test" case
rather than pursue weaker cases? What collateral factors would be permissible bases for a
decision not to prosecute, e.g., the pendency of another criminal proceeding elsewhere
against the same parties? What sort of review should be available in cases like the present
one where the conduct complained of allegedly violates state as well as federal laws? See
generally, Schwartz, Federal Criminal Jurisdiction and Prosecutors' Discretion, 13 Law &
Contemp. Probl. 64 (1948). With limited personnel and facilities at his disposal, what
priority would the prosecutor be required to give to cases in which investigation or prose-
cution was directed by the court?
See generally Vorenberg, supra note 4, at 1569 n.148: "On the rare occasions when courts explain
why they decline to review prosecutorial discretion, they do sometimes note the absence of any
judicially discoverable guidelines or standards for the use of discretion that might permit judicial
review." IAL (citations omitted).
65. See Rockefeller, 477 F.2d at 380 (secrecy of grand jury and prosecutor's file may serve to
protect accused's reputation from damage based on insufficient, improper or malicious charges). See
generally Note, supra note 51, at 141-42.
One final "barrier" to judicial review of the charging decision which has been cited by courts is
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In addition to these reasons, commentators have identified fresh policy
objections to judicial review of the charging decision. One objection is that
the prosecutor needs freedom to decline to prosecute certain individuals in
exchange for their cooperation in the prosecution of others. 66 Another is
that the prosecutor needs the flexibility to offer plea bargain terms that are
sufficiently desirable to the defendant to render the defendant's guilty plea
voluntary. 67 Finally, one commentator argues that the decision to prosecute
should not be subject to judicial review because such review would interfere
with the development of internal controls. 68
Denial of Standing
Beyond this general reluctance to review charging decisions, the courts
have found an additional reason not to review charging decisions at the re-
quest of victims. When the victim files an action seeking review of the prose-
cutor's charging decision, courts have often concluded that the victim has no
standing to challenge the charging decision. The leading case is Linda R. S.
v. Richard D.,69 wherein the mother of an illegitimate child sued to enjoin
the local district attorney from refusing to prosecute the father for non-sup-
port.70 The Court dismissed the case for lack of standing and stated:
The Court's prior decisions consistently hold that a citizen lacks stand-
ing to contest the policies of the prosecuting authority when he himself
is neither prosecuted nor threatened with prosecution.... [In] Ameri-
can jurisprudence at least, a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable
interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.
71
With this broad language the Court established that private citizens
lack standing either to compel or to restrain the prosecution of another. Be-
cause the "private citizen" who challenged the prosecutor in this case was
the victim, 72 the case also established that victims are to be treated no differ-
analyzed in Note, supra note 51, at 134-36. That barrier is that an agency's decision not to prosecute
would constitute a negative order which would lack the finality and formality required for judicial
review under the Administrative Procedure Act. This barrier to judicial review is not dealt with in
detail herein because problems specific to administrative criminal actions are adequately covered in
that work.
66. Vorenberg, supra note 4, at 1542-44.
67. Id. at 1553-54.
68. Abrams, supra note 55, at 52.
69. 410 U.S. 614 (1973).
70. The case involved a state criminal statute which made it a misdemeanor to refuse to supply
child support. The district attorney declined to prosecute the father for non-support because the
Texas courts had interpreted this statute to apply only to parents of legitimate children, and the
child in question was illegitimate. The complaint asserted that this was a "discriminatory applica-
tion" of the statute, probably in an attempt to fit the case within those where courts have been
willing to review charging decisions to ensure equal protection. See infra notes 156-62 and accompa-
nying text. However, this effort was unsuccessful. The Court stated:
The proper party to challenge the constitutionality of Article 602 would be a parent of a
legitimate child who has been prosecuted under the statute. Such a challenge would allege
that because the parents of illegitimate children may not be prosecuted, the statute unfairly
discriminates against the parents of legitimate children.
Id. at 619 n.5.
71. Id. at 619.




ently from any other private citizen for purposes of standing to challenge the
prosecutor's charging decision.
Later in its opinion, the Court seemed to limit the holding as it might
apply to victims. The Court stated:
Appellant does have an interest in the support of her child. But given
the special status of criminal prosecutions in our system, we hold that
appellant has made an insufficient showing of a direct nexus between
the vindication of her interest and the enforcement of the State's crimi-
nal laws.
7 3
This language suggests that victims do not lack standing categorically;
rather, this particular victim failed to make an adequate showing of the re-
quired direct nexus between the plaintiff/victim's interest and enforcement
of the criminal laws.74 Nevertheless, as the cases below indicate, no court
has ever granted a victim standing to challenge a prosecutor's charging
decision.
In Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller,75 the inmates
of Attica prison filed a mandamus action to compel state and federal officials
to prosecute corrections officers for brutality during the prison uprising.
76
On the standing question, the Court reviewed Linda R. S. and concluded
that the Attica facts were distinguishable in two respects. First, there was a
more direct nexus shown in Attica between the plaintiffs' personal interest in
avoiding harm and the criminal prosecution: In Attica, a successful prosecu-
tion would serve to deter the corrections officers from harming the plain-
tiffs/victims whereas, in Linda R. S., a successful prosecution would serve
only to jail the child's father and not to support the child. 77 The second
73. Linda 1. S., 410 U.S. at 619.
74. Professor Goldstein points out that a direct nexus between the victim's injury and the crimi-
nal action could easily have been established if the defendant's sentence had been carefully shaped:
The Court believed the plaintiff's only hope for support payments lay in the "speculative"
effect a jail sentence might have on the defendant's conduct. Yet, in 1973, when the case
was decided, the defendant might have been ordered to make child support payments upon
conviction for nonsupport under two Texas procedures: (1) He could have been ordered to
make child support payments as a condition of probation; (2) The judge could have or-
dered him to serve a sentence during off-hours and on weekends so that he could continue
his employment and designate a portion of his wages for the support of his dependents. It
appears, therefore, that if the district attorney had prosecuted the defendant, the Texas
court could have ordered him to pay child support in the criminal case and there would
have been a "direct nexus between the vindication of [the victim plaintiff's] interest and the
enforcement of the state's criminal law.
Goldstein, supra note 4, at 551 (footnotes omitted). The Court was apparently determined to find
that the victim had no standing.
75. 477 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1973).
76. Id. at 375-77.
77. The court stated:
Thus a more immediate and direct danger of injury resulting from nonenforcement is
presented here than in Linda R. S., where the Court stressed that the only result of the
relief sought by the illegitimate child's mother would be the jailing of the child's father, not
the support of the child. Where a successful prosecution, however, would serve to deter
the accused from harming the complainant rather than merely supply a penal inducement
to perform a duty to provide assistance, the complaining person does show a more direct
nexus between his personal interest in protection from harm and the prosecution.
Id. at 378.
The same deterrence rationale could be used to argue that jailing the father in Linda R.S. would
deter him from refusing to provide support in the future. This is the same as the inmates not being
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distinction noted by the court was the existence of allegations in the com-
plaint that there had been selective and discriminatory prosecution because
37 inmates, but no corrections officers, had been indicted.78 After describing
these distinctions, and noting that the standing issue raised "troublesome
questions," the Second Circuit concluded it did not have to decide the stand-
ig question because relief would be denied on the merits.79 Thus, all of the
standing discussion was dicta. The court's analysis in distinguishing Linda
R. S. and finding a more direct nexus suggests a willingness to analyze the
standing of victims on a case by case basis rather than denying standing to
victims categorically, but no decision was rendered on this point.
The Supreme Court again confronted the standing issue, but in a some-
what different context, in Leeke v. Timmerman.80 In Leeke, the victims
were inmates of a South Carolina prison who filed a Section 1983 action
against state corrections officials.81 The inmates had provided information
to a magistrate regarding the brutality of prison guards during a disturbance.
The magistrate concluded that probable cause existed and announced his
intent to issue arrest warrants for the guards. Thereafter, state officials de-
cided they would not seek indictments against the guards and the officials
wrote to the magistrate asking that the arrest warrants not be issued. The
magistrate accordingly declined to issue the warrants. The complaint al-
leged that the officials had conspired in bad faith, and sought to have the
arrest warrants issued.82
In a per curiam decision, the Court concluded that Linda R. S. con-
trolled and that the plaintiffs/victims had no standing. The Court found
that, like Linda R. S., Leeke involved a "questionable nexus" between the
plaintiffs' injuries (beatings) and the defendants' conduct (providing infor-
mation to a magistrate). 83 The Court reasoned that, even assuming criminal
prosecution could provide a remedy for the beatings, the issuance of an
arrest warrant is not the beginning of a prosecution but is "simply a prelude
cured or compensated for their injuries. All criminal deterrence is future-oriented and will not cure
the current harm.
78. The court stated:
It may also be argued that since 37 inmates have been indicted for crimes relating to
the events at Attica in September 1971, without any indictment having been filed against
any of the accused state officials, the complaint alleges a sufficient threat of selective and
discriminatory prosecution of the plaintiff inmates to meet the standing requirements dis-
cussed in Linda R.S. v. Richard D.
Rockefeller, 477 F.2d at 378.
79. The court stated:
Thus in order to determine whether plaintiffs have standing to sue we would be re-
quired to resolve troublesome questions. However, we need not decide the issue of stand-
ing because we believe that even if they may properly present their claims for judicial
resolution, they seek relief which cannot, in this case at least, be granted either against the
state or federal prosecuting authorities.
Id. at 379. Cf. Hall, supra note 6, at 966: "The (Attica] court concluded that the inmates did have
standing under a federal mandamus statute to compel the United States Attorney to investigate and
institute prosecutions against state officials." Id. (footnote omitted). In view of the language quoted
from Attica, it is unclear how Professor Hall reached this conclusion.
80. 454 U.S. 83 (1981).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 84-85.
83. Id. at 86.
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to actual prosecution."' 84 And, because the decision to prosecute remained
solely within the prosecutor's discretion, the mere issuance of an arrest war-
rant could logically provide no relief.
85
Leeke is distinguishable from the other standing cases in that the relief
sought is not the filing of criminal charges but the issuance of an arrest war-
rant. But the case is valuable because it provides the most recent standing
analysis, and the Court reiterated its position that there was an insufficient
nexus. Leeke, therefore, supports the conclusion that victims don't lack
standing categorically, but rather have, in the cases to date, merely failed to
establish a sufficient nexus between the harm they suffered and relief in the
form of a criminal prosecution.
In Sackinger v. Nevins, 86 the plaintiff was a prisoner who filed a pro se
petition which the court treated as a mandamus action. The petition asked
inter alia that the sheriff and district attorney be ordered to fie criminal
charges against a prison guard who had allegedly struck the plaintiff with a
key ring.87 At the oral argument, the plaintiff/victim withdrew his request
for this particular relief so the court did not rule on the issue. However, the
court did discuss the issue. The court characterized the plaintiff's with-
drawal as "well advised"8 8 and implied that it would have denied the request
to direct the sheriff or district attorney to file charges. The court announced
it had discovered no law, statutory or decisional, which would support such
a request.89 The court concluded that Leeke v. Timmerman controlled the
issue, so the plaintiff had no standing.90
Two points are interesting about Sackinger. First, the court's reliance
on Leeke v. Timmerman is inexplicable considering that Linda R. S. had just
been decided and was more on point.91 Second, Sackinger is interesting be-
cause, like the Attica case, resolution of the standing question was unneces-
sary to the decision, and yet the court discussed it anyway. Unlike the
84. Id.
85. Id. at 87.
Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun dissented in favor of plenary review. They argued
that the Court mischaracterized the plaintiff's injury: the injury was not the beatings but the depri-
vation of their constitutional right of access to the courts. Thus there was a "substantial nexus"
between the plaintiffs' injury and defendants' acts, and Linda R. S. was "wholly inapposite." Id. at
89.
86. 114 Misc. 2d 454, 451 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (Sup. Ct. 1982).
87. Id. at 461, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 1007.
88. Id. at 462, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 1010.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 461, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 1010. The court stated:
This court is of the opinion that [Leeke v. Timmerman] embraces broadly the issues raised
relative to the obligation of the sheriff and district attorney to file criminal charges. The
decision to file, or not file criminal charges, like the decision to issue warrants, or not issue
warrants, is within the discretion of the party involved.
Id. (citation omitted).
91. Linda R. S., discussed supra in text accompanying notes 69-74, was a better precedent for
Sackinger because Linda R. S. and Sackinger both were actions to compel the prosecutor to file
criminal charges. In contrast, the Leeke case, discussed supra in text accompanying notes 80-82, was
an action to compel the issuance of an arrest warrant. The Leeke Court noted this distinction when
it stated, "[T]he issuance of an arrest warrant in this case is simply a prelude to actual prosecution.
Respondents concede that the decision to prosecute is solely within the discretion of the prosecutor."
Leeke, 454 U.S. at 86-87.
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Second Circuit, however, the New York court intimated it would deny
standing.
In Commonwealth v. Malloy,92 a case which arose in an unusual pos-
ture, the court reached the same conclusion that victims lack standing. In
Malloy, informations charging theft and conspiracy were dismissed for insuf-
ficient evidence. When the district attorney refused to appeal or to authorize
an appeal, the victim/complainant himself filed a notice of appeal. 93 The
court quashed the appeal on the basis that the parties to a criminal action are
the state and the defendant, and the victim, as a nonparty, has no standing to
appeal. The court stated: "Criminal prosecutions are not to settle private
grievances but are to rectify the injury done, to the Commonwealth. The
individual who is the victim of a crime only has recourse in a civil action for
damages." a94 Thus, the courts have consistently denied victims the right to
challenge the charging decision on the basis that victims have no standing.9"
Denial on the Merits
Assuming a court has overcome its reluctance to review charging deci-
sions, and assuming the victim has survived the standing analysis, the relief
sought by victims is denied on the merits. The courts will act only to halt a
prosecution, never to compel one. Victims are usually seeking to compel a
prosecution that the prosecutor has declined,96 and the response of the
courts has been a consistent denial of relief.97 The specific basis for the de-
nial is that mandamus is not available,98 or that no cause of action to compel
prosecution exists. 99
Courts have often concluded that mandamus will not lie to compel
prosecution.10 The most comprehensive consideration of mandamus relief
is found in Inmates of Attica v. Rockefeller 101 wherein the Second Circuit
affirmed the dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim. Regard-
ing the mandamus of state prosecutors, the court found state officials under
no duty to prosecute;102 on the contrary, under New York law, the prosecu-
92. 304 Pa. Super. 297, 450 A.2d 689 (1982).
93. Id. at 691.
94. Id. at 693.
95. Although the courts have concluded victims have no legal interest which would confer
standing to compel the prosecution of another, the President's Task Force states that when a crime
occurs, the victim, not the state, is directly aggrieved and has an "unquestionably valid interest" in
the prosecution. President's Task Force, supra note 5, Prosecutors' Recommendation 1,
Commentary.
96. See, eg., cases discussed supra at text accompanying notes 69-95, all of which were at-
tempts by victims to compel prosecution; Hall, supra note 6, at 971 ("[Tlhere are very few reported
cases in which a victim attempts to stop criminal prosecution .. ") (footnote omitted). However,
victims do occasionally seek to block a prosecution; three such cases are discussed at id. at 971-72.
97. See also Hall, supra note 6, at 968 ("mTlhe courts thus far are unanimous in holding that
mandamus will not issue to compel prosecution.").
98. See infra notes 100-17 and accompanying text.
99. See infra notes 118-22 and accompanying text.
100. See LaFave, supra note 59, at 538 ("If a specific instance of nonenforcement is challenged in
the courts by way of a mandamus action, the usual response is that the matter rests with the execu-
tive rather than the judicial branch of government." (footnote omitted). See generally Hall, supra
note 6, at 968-70.
101. 477 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1973).
102. Id. at 377.
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tor has discretion whether to prosecute and this discretion "is not subject to
review in the state courts."'' 0 3 As to the mandamus against the U.S. Attor-
ney, the court noted that the statute authorized mandamus only to compel
an officer "to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff," and not to direct the
exercise of discretion. 1° 4 The court noted that courts had uniformly re-
frained from overturning the discretionary decisions of federal authorities
not to prosecute. 0 5 This reluctance, the court explained, was based not only
on the separation of powers doctrine but also on other problems inherent in
the courts' adopting the role of "superprosecutors."'10 6 Essentially, this case
holds that mandamus is not available because the prosecutor has no duty to
the victim.
In Milliken v. Stone,'0 7 the plaintiffs were American shipowners who
filed a complaint seeking to compel the U.S. Attorney to prosecute British
shipowners for transporting liquor in violation of the National Prohibition
Act.10 8 The complaint actually requested that the U.S. Attorney be enjoined
from failing to prosecute the British shipowners but the court stated that, in
substance and effect, the plaintiffs were seeking mandamus to compel the
U.S. Attorney to enforce the Act.'0 9 The court dismissed the action on the
grounds that the federal courts had no power to compel enforcement of the
penal laws." 0
In Pugach v. Klein,"' a state prisoner filed an application for manda-
mus to compel the U.S. Attorney to prosecute state law enforcement officials
for putting a wiretap on his telephone in violation of federal law. The court
denied the application on the ground that it did not have jurisdiction to issue
original writs of mandamus.'12 The court went on to state that, even ifjuris-
diction existed, it would still deny the mandamus because federal courts
have no power to interfere with the U.S. Attorney's exercise of charging
discretion." 3 The court stated:
The court cannot compel [the U.S. Attorney] to prosecute a complaint,
or even an indictment, whatever his reason for not acting.... Nor is
there a residual power in private citizens to take law enforcement into
their own hands when the United States Attorney does not prosecute,
for any, or for no reason.' 
14
103. Id. at 382.
104. Id. at 379.
105. Id. ("[Flederal courts have traditionally and, to our knowledge, uniformly refrained from
overturning, at the instance of a private person, discretionary decisions of federal prosecuting au-
thorities not to prosecute persons ... ").
106. Id. at 379-80. These other problems are discussed supra at text accompanying notes 63-65.
107. 7 F.2d 397 (S.D.N.Y. 1925).
108. Id. at 398. Of course, the crimes defined by the Prohibition Act were consensual crimes, so
it is difficult to identify any specific victim. Here the plaintiffs, American shipowners, were suffering
financially because they were prosecuted for transporting liquor while British shipowners were not.
Whether this qualifies them as victims is debatable.
109. Id. at 399.
110. Id. Accord, Ray v. Department of Justice, 508 F. Supp. 724, 725 (E.D. Mo. 1981).
111. 193 F. Supp. 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
112. Id. at 633-34.
113. Thus like the discussion of standing in Rockefeller and Sackinger, (discussed supra at text
accompanying notes 75-79 and 86-90 respectively) this discussion of mandamus was unnecessary to
the decision.
114. Pugach, 193 F. Supp. at 635.
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In Powell v. Katzenbach,11 5 the plaintiff filed a pro se action "in the
nature of mandamus" against the U.S. Attorney General to compel prosecu-
tion of a national bank and several individuals for criminal conspiracy.116
The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the complaint for failure to
state a claim, explaining that the decision to prosecute is within the Attorney
General's discretion and mandamus will not lie to control the exercise of this
charging discretion." 17
Without relying on the unavailability of the specific mandamus remedy,
the courts have also denied the victim's right to compel prosecution on the
more general ground that no such right exists. In Manning v. Municipal
Court ofRoxbury District,18 the plaintiff/victim sought to charge Baltimore
Orioles pitcher Ross Grimsley with assault and battery with a deadly
weapon when he was hit on the head with a baseball thrown by Grimsley. A
complaint was initially issued, but the court dismissed it for lack of probable
cause, and the district attorney declined to present the case to a grand jury.
The plaintiff/victim then sued the judge, asking that the judge be required to
find probable cause or to hold a new hearing, and the district attorney, ask-
ing that the district attorney be required to proceed with prosecution. 19
The trial judge dismissed the complaint and was affirmed on appeal. The
court reasoned that a victim has "no right" to challenge a judicial determi-
nation regarding probable cause.120 A criminal complaint is issued in the
interest of the state, not the victim; the victim's remedy lies in a civil action.
The court quoted with approval from Linda R. S., but the decision did not
otherwise mention or rely on the concept of standing.' 2 '
As to the defendant district attorney in Manning, the court stated that
he had wide discretion in charging and could refuse to prosecute based on
his own judgment without appeal to or approval by another.' 22 In other
words, the plaintiff/victim had no right to challenge the charging decision.
The victim's right to participate in the charging decision has also arisen
in other contexts.' 23 The posture of the cases vary, but the result is always
115. 359 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
116. This is a brief per curiam decision. The court did not specify what type of conspiracy was
involved; it said only that it was a conspiracy under Title 18 of the U.S. Code. Id. Moreover, the
court did not identify the plaintiff, so it is impossible to determine whether the plaintiff was the
victim of the crime.
117. Id. at. 235. In addition to these cases, see also Sackinger v. Nevins, 114 Misc. 2d 454, 451
N.Y.S.2d 1005 (Sup. Ct. 1982) which is discussed in this Article as a standing case, see supra text
accompanying notes 86-90, but which also deals with a denial of mandamus-type relief on the basis
that such relief is not available to compel performance of a discretionary act. Sackinger, 114 Misc.
2d at 461, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 1010.
118. 372 Mass. 315, 361 N.E.2d 1274 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
119. Id. at 316, 361 N.E.2d at 1275.
120. Id. at 317, 361 N.E.2d at 1276. The facts of this case are similar on this point to Common-
wealth v. Malloy, 304 Pa. Super. 297, 450 A.2d 689 (1982), discussed supra at text accompanying
notes 92-95. In both cases, criminal charges were dismissed due to insufficient evidence. The cases
differ in the victim's response: in Manning the victim sued the judge and prosecutor to compel
prosecution whereas in Malloy the victim sought to appeal the court's finding that the evidence was
insufficient.
121. Manning, 361 N.E.2d at 1276.
122. Id
123. See, eg., New York v. Muka, 440 F. Supp. 33 (N.D.N.Y. 1977). Muka sought to file a
federal criminal information against several unidentified individuals. It is unclear whether Muka
was the victim of the alleged crimes because the opinion does not identify the crimes or the potential
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the same. Regardless of whether the victim tries to file criminal charges
herself,124 or tries to appeal dismissal of the charges himself,125 or more
commonly files a civil action to compel the prosecutor to file charges, 126 the
courts refuse victims any relief. Different reasons may be cited for the de-
nial, but the result is consistent. Victims have no formal role in the charging
decision and the courts have resisted attempts to establish one.
IMPLEMENTATION OF VICTIM PARTICIPATION
IN THE CHARGING DECISION
Assume a jurisdiction has decided to incorporate victims into the charg-
ing decision. Considering the existing law, how should this be done? May
existing limits on prosecutorial discretion be used to implement victim par-
ticipation or must new limits be devised?
The Charging Decision is Made by the Prosecutor
with Few Limits on Discretion
The charging decision is currently made exclusively by the prosecu-
tor. 127 The prosecutor's initial source of authority is statutes which establish
defendants. The court struck the filing stating, "It is well settled that a private citizen has no right to
prosecute a federal crime." 440 F. Supp. at 36. This case is reminiscient of Commonwealth v.
Malloy, see supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text, where the victim tried to file his own appeal:
here the victim tried to file her own charges. Sometimes victims forego trying to force the prosecutor
to act and strike out on their own. Muka is part of the continuing saga of the same Betty 0. Muka
involved in People v. Muka, 421 N.Y.S.2d 438 (Sup. Ct. 1979). See infra note 171. In that case, the
court stated that Muka had demanded prosecution of various public officials on 333 charges.
Muka's tenacity seems inexplicable unless she was at least indirectly victimized by these public offi-
cials.
See also Fleetwood v. Thompson, 358 F. Supp. 310 (N.D. In. 1972), wherein the plaintiff pris-
oner filed a civil rights action claiming inter alia that he had been deprived of his civil rights by
federal prosecutors when they declined to commence perjury prosecutions against witnesses who had
testified against the plaintiff. (Presumably the allegedly perjured testimony was responsible for the
plaintiff's incarceration, so he would qualify as a "victim" of perjury.) The court dismissed the
complaint for failure to state a claim. The court stated that since U.S. Attorneys could not be
compelled to prosecute, there had been no deprivation of civil rights when they declined to do so.
Id. at 311.
See also Note, supra note 51, at 152-53 (referring to the courts' "failure to find in criminal
statutes any private rights with respect to public enforcement.") (footnote omitted). In this Note,
the author states that "In recent years, some courts have begun to recognize that private citizens
affected by violations of the criminal law have a private right to invoke its public sanctions .. " Id.
Two points should be made regarding this statement. First, nowhere does the author mention Linda
R. S., wherein the United States Supreme Court broadly denied victims standing. See supra text
accompanying notes 69-74. It is unclear why this case is not mentioned, since it was decided just
two years before the note was published and it suggested there were no private rights. Second, all
the more recent cases, at least since 1975, deny victims any private right to invoke public sanctions.
See supra text accompanying notes 69-123. So the quoted statement does not identify a trend. In
fact, the author's contradictory statement six pages later ("IT]he courts will in all likelihood con-
tinue to view with hostility requests for review in relation to criminal matters .. " Id. at 159 turned
out to be the correct prediction.
124. New York v. Muka, 440 F. Supp. 33 (N.D.N.Y. 1977).
125. Commonwealth v. Malloy, 304 Pa. Super. 297, 450 A.2d 689 (1982).
126. See supra text accompanying notes 69-121.
127. The charging decision (Le., the initial decision whether to file charges) should be distin-
guished from the decision to dismiss pending charges. United States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504, 509
(5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 183 (5th Cir. 1965) (Brown, J., concurring).
Court approval is required for the prosecutor to dismiss charges in the federal system and in most
states. See F. R. CR. P. 48(a) ("United States attorney may by leave of court file a dismissal of an
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the office of prosecutor and authorize the prosecutor to prosecute all
crimes.128 Some of these statutes explicitly permit the prosecutor to exercise
discretion in deciding which cases to prosecute,129 some statutes are silent on
discretion, 130 and some statutes make prosecution mandatory.' 3' But, in
spite of the mandatory language in this latter type of statute, and in spite of
the mandatory language used in criminal codes generally, 132 courts have
concluded that it is within the prosecutor's discretion to initiate or decline
prosecution 133 and to choose which offense to charge.
1 34
indictment, information or complaint.. ."); Ky. R. CR. P. 9.64; OHIO R. CR. P. 48(A); State v.
LeMatty, 263 N.W.2d 559, 561 (Iowa App. 1977) (statute requires court approval where prosecutor
seeks dismissal of criminal case); Note, Restructuring the Plea Bargain, 82 YALE L.J. 286, 307 n.73
(1972) ("In most jurisdictions, the prosecutor cannot nolle prosequi a charge.., without first ob-
taining judicial approval."). Court approval is not universally required, see ABA STANDARDS RE-
LATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY, Std. 14-3.1 History of Standard (1979) ("In some jurisdictions the
prosecutor has discretion, regardless of court approval, to dismiss charges against the defendant.");
Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 27, at 930 (noting split of authority as to whether
court approval is required to enter a nol pros); see generally Note, Prosecutor's Discretion, 103 U. PA.
L. REV. 1057 (1955). In the jurisdictions where a court order is required for dismissal, the courts
are deferential to the prosecution's position on dismissal. See United States v. Perate, 719 F.2d 706,
710 (4th Cir. 1983); United States v. Hamm, 659 F.2d 624, 629 (5th Cir. 1981); State v. Aubol, 244
N.W.2d 636 (Minn. 1976). Nonetheless, in these jurisdictions a court order is required, so the deci-
sion to dismiss charges is distinguishable from the decision to file charges because the decision to
dismiss is not made exclusively by the prosecutor.
Also distinguishable from the charging decision is the decision to amend pending charges. Like
the dismissal of charges, amendment of charges generally requires court approval. See, e.g., F. R.
CR. P. 7(e) (court may allow amendment); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3201(4) (same). Federal courts
usually sustain prosecution motions to amend criminal charges, see Government of Canal Zone v.
Burjan, 596 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Goldstein, 386 F. Supp. 833 (D. Del. 1973).
States, however, disagree on how to treat prosecution motions to amend criminal charges. Compare
State v. Pruett, 213 Kan. 41, 47, 515 P.2d 1051, 1057 (1973) (trial judge has no right to substitute his
judgment for that of the prosecutor on amendment of the charges absent some compelling reason to
protect the defendant) with State v. Haner, 95 Wash. 2d 858, 864-65, 631 P.2d 381, 385 (1981) (no
abuse of discretion for trial judge to deny prosecution motion to amend charges). Regardless of the
standard applied, the court order requirement means that the decision to amend charges does not
rest exclusively with the prosecutor. In that respect, the decision to amend is distinguishable from
the initial charging decision.
128. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 547 (1966); CAL. Gov. CODE § 26500 (1987); N.Y. COUNTY LAW
§ 700(1) (1972); 16 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1402 (1987); Ky. REV. STAT. § 15.725(l) (1985); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 8-7-103 (1980).
129. See, eg., CAL. Gov. CODE § 26500 (1987) ("The public prosecutor shall attend the courts,
and within his or her discretion shall initiate and conduct on behalf of the people all
prosecutions ... ").
130. See, eg., MD. CODE, art. 10 § 34 (the state's attorney "shall prosecute and defend ... all
cases in which the state may be interested."); N.Y. COUNTY LAW § 700(1) (1972); 16 PA. STAT.
ANN. § 1402 (1987) (the district attorney "shall sign all bills of indictment and conduct in court all
criminal and other prosecutions .. "); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-7-103 (1980) ("It shall be the duty of
each district attorney general: (1) To... prosecute on behalf of the state in every case in which the
state is a party, or in anywise interested.").
131. See, eg., 28 U.S.C. § 547 (1966) ("[E]ach United States attorney ... shall - (1) prosecute
for all offenses against the United States... ."); KY. REv. STAT. § 15.725(1) (1985) ("The Common-
wealth's attorney shall ...have the duty to prosecute all violations of the criminal and penal
laws. .. ").
132. All criminal statutes are drafted in mandatory terms. See, eg., 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1984)
("Whoever unlawfully ... kidnaps... any person... shall be punished by imprisonment .... "); 18
U.S.C. § 1955(a) (1984) ("Whoever conducts... an illegal gambling business shall be fined not
more than $20,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both."). See Note, Prosecutorial
Discretion in the Initiation of Criminal Complaints, 42 S. CAL. L. REV. 519, 521 (1969) (criminal
codes have no express provision for discretion).
133. See Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 381 (2d Cir. 1973)
(mandatory language in 28 U.S.C. § 547 has "never been thought to preclude the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion"); People v. Gallegos, 644 P.2d 920, 930 (Colo. 1982) (en banc) (criminal
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The prosecutor's discretion in the charging decision is broad.135 The
statutes are drafted in mandatory terms but prosecutor retains charging discretion); State v. Lee, 87
Wash. 2d 932, 933-34, 558 P.2d 236, 237 (1976) (mandatory habitual criminal statute subject to
implicit reasonableness standard governing prosecutor's exercise of discretion in initiating proceed-
ings); Note, supra note 51, at 152 (mandatory language of criminal statutes has not been construed
to restrict prosecutorial discretion). Even where the statute provides that the prosecutor is "author-
ized and required" to institute prosecutions, ag., 42 U.S.C. § 1987 (1982) (emphasis added), courts
have endorsed "the normal assumption of executive discretion." Rockefeller, 477 F.2d at 381; see
also Moses v. Kennedy, 219 F. Supp. 762, 765 (D.D.C. 1963), affirmed, 342 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir.
1965).
For the more general proposition that the decision to prosecute is within the prosecutor's dis-
cretion, see United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 119 (1979); United States v. Torquato, 630
F.2d 564, 569 (3d Cir. 1979) ("The choice of whom to prosecute and the strategy of prosecution are
generally matters left wholly to the government's control."); United States v. Johnson, 577 F.2d
1304, 1307 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Hall, 559 F.2d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1977); United States
v. Kysar, 459 F.2d 422, 424 (10th Cir. 1972); Ray v. Department of Justice, 508 F. Supp. 724, 725
(E.D. Mo. 1981); Fleetwood v. Thompson, 358 F. Supp. 310, 311 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Hoines v. Bar-
ney's Club, Inc., 28 Cal. 3d 603, 611, 620 P.2d 628, 633, 170 Cal. Rptr. 42, 47 (1980); Esteybar v.
Municipal Court, 5 Cal. 3d 119, 485 P.2d 1140,95 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1971); Commonwealth v. McKin-
ney, 594 S.W.2d 884 (Ky. 1979); State v. Spicer, 299 N.C. 309, 311, 261 S.E.2d 893, 895 (N.C. 1980)
(district attorneys' discretion "encompasses the discretion to decide who will or will not be prose-
cuted"); People v. DiFalco, 44 N.Y.2d 482, 406 N.Y.S.2d 279, 377 N.E.2d 732, (1978); Common-
wealth v. Malloy, 304 Pa. Super. 297, 302, 450 A.2d 689, 691-92 (1982) ("The prosecutor is under
no compulsion to prosecute every alleged offender, and the decision to prosecute or not to prosecute
is a matter within his discretion.").
134. United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114 (1979). In Batchelder, the defendant was con-
victed of receiving a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(h) (1982) and sentenced to the maximum
term of five years allowed for that crime by 18 U.S.C. § 924(a) (1984). The court of appeals re-
versed and remanded for resentencing. The basis for this reversal was that § 922(h) and another
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1202(a) (1984) contained identical elements as to a convicted felon receiving a
firearm, and since § 1202(a) allowed a maximum sentence of only two years, this maximum applied
as well to convictions under § 922(h). The Supreme Court reversed, and stated, "Just as a defendant
has no constitutional right to elect which of two applicable federal statutes shall be the basis of his
indictment and prosecution neither is he entitled to choose the penalty scheme under which he will
be sentenced." Batchelder, 442 U.S. at 125. (citations omitted). See also United States v. Sedovic,
679 F.2d 1233, 1236 (8th Cir. 1982); United States v. Hamm, 659 F.2d 624, 628 n.13 (5th Cir. 1981);
Hutcherson v. United States, 345 F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. den., 382 U.S. 894 (1965); Deutsch
v. Aderhold, 80 F.2d 677, 678 (5th Cir. 1935); Metcalf v. Municipal Court, 125 Cal. App. 3d 303,
307, 178 Cal. Rptr. 47, 49 (Ct. App. 1981) (sole discretion to select nature of charge rests with
prosecutor); State v. Darden, 171 Conn. 677, 682, 372 A.2d 99, 102 (1976) (prosecutor has "great
responsibility and broad discretion with respect to selecting an appropriate charge"); People v. Mc-
Collough, 57 Il1. 2d 440, 313 N.E.2d 462 (1974); People ex rel. Leonard v. Papp, 386 Mich. 672, 194
N.W.2d 673 (1972); State v. Thornton, 9 Wash. App. 699, 703, 514 P.2d 179, 182 (Ct. App. 1973)
(whether deadly weapon charge is indicted is within prosecutor's discretion); ABA STANDARDS ON
THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION, Std. 3-3.9, Commentary (1971) (prosecutor is entitled to use multiple
charges, to "charge broadly").
135. Cowan, 524 F.2d at 513 (executive is "absolute judge" of whether a prosecution should be
initiated); United States v. Shober, 489 F. Supp. 393, 405 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (prosecutor's charging
discretion is "exceedingly broad"); In re Grand Jury of S.D. Alabama, 508 F. Supp. 1210, 1214 (S.D.
Ala. 1980) ("It is the exclusive authority and absolute discretion of the U.S. Attorney to decide
whether to prosecute a case."); People v. Gallegos, 644 P.2d 920, 930 (Col. 1982) (en banc) (prosecu-
tor's charging discretion is "uniquely broad"); Manning v. Municipal Court, 372 Mass. 315, 318, 361
N.E.2d 1274, 1276 (1977) (prosecutor has "wide discretion" in charging); State v. Spicer, 299 N.C.
309, 311, 261 S.E.2d 893, 895 (1980) (same); People v. DiFalco, 44 N.Y.2d 482, 377 N.E.2d 732
(1978) (prosecutor has "broad discretion" in charging); K.C. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 225
(1969) (prosecutor has "huge discretionary power" at charging stage); Goldstein, supra note 6, at
548 (prosecutor "has been endowed by the courts with a broad and virtually unreviewable discretion
in [the matter of] charging .... ); LaFave, supra note 59, at 533 (prosecutor has traditionally exer-
cised "considerable discretion in deciding whether or not to prosecute"); Vorenberg, supra note 4, at
1525 ("Decisions whether and what to charge.... have been left in prosecutor's hands with very few
limitations."); Note, supra note 132, at 521 (prosecutor has traditionally enjoyed "virtually unlim-
ited" discretion to abstain from prosecution and to prosecute selectively).
Finally, in assessing the breadth of the prosecutor's charging discretion, one court has deter-
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few limits which exist on the prosecutor's charging discretion can be divided
into those enforced in the courts and those which draw their enforcement
from other sources.
a. Limits on Prosecutorial Discretion Imposed by Sources
Outside the Courts
There are four limits on the prosecutor's charging decision imposed by
forces outside the courts. The first limitation exists in the criminal statutes
themselves. Common law crimes are largely extinct. As a result the prose-
cutor may not charge a crime unless the conduct falls within a criminal stat-
ute. 136 This limit is defined by the legislature when the penal code is
drafted.137 However, because legislators draft penal codes in general and
often ambiguous language, 138 the initial decision as to what constitutes crim-
inal conduct is effectively left to the prosecutor. Moreover, many criminal
statutes overlap, 139 and this overcriminalization gives the prosecutor wider
choice at the charging stage.14°
A second limit on the prosecutor's charging discretion, which is im-
posed by the legislature, is the level of funding the legislature allocates to
prosecutors' offices. This pursestring limit has a significant practical impact
on charging decisions.
141
The third limit on the prosecutor's charging discretion, is internal
guidelines, a limit which is self-imposed by the executive. 142 These internal
guidelines have been adopted recently in response to pressure to limit
prosecutorial discretion and to reveal the bases for charging decisions.
143
mined that it is error if the prosecutor fails to exercise discretion. See State v. Pettitt, 93 Wash. 2d
288, 296, 609 P.2d 1364, 1368 (1980) (in prosecuting habitual criminals, use of fixed formula instead
of discretion is error; remanded for resentencing based on recommendation "reached through the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion.").
136. State v. Lee, 87 Wash. 2d 932, 558 P.2d 236 (1976) (decision to prosecute must be based on
prosecutor's ability to meet proof required by the statute); Vorenberg, supra note 4, at 1542.
137. This limit ultimately depends on the courts for enforcement in that a prosecutor who files
charges not based on a criminal statute will have the charges dismissed by the court. Nonetheless,
this limit is defined primarily by the legislature when it enacts the criminal statutes.
138. See, eg., 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1983), the basic federal conspiracy statute, which has generated
considerable case law interpreting its very general terms. See ABA STANDARDS ON THE PROSECU-
TION FUNCTION, Std. 3-3.9 Commentary; Vorenberg, supra note 4, at 1567 ("A major source of
excess prosecutorial power is the loose drafting and overly casual definition of conduct as criminal
that characterize the nation's penal codes."); Note, supra note 132, at 533 (charging discretion as
result of, inter alia, ambiguity in statutes and fact that statutes are general mandates).
139. See, eg., 18 U.S.C. § 922(h) (1982) and 18 U.S.C. APP. § 1202(a) (1983), which overlap as
applied to a convicted felon receiving a firearm. This redundancy was discussed in United States v.
Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114 (1979) and United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971).
140. See generally LaFave, supra note 59, at 533 ("legislative overcriminalization" as reason for
breadth of charging discretion).
141. See generally Vorenberg, supra note 4, at 1542-43.
142. See, eg., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 6, Part B ("initiating and Declining Prosecu-
tion") and Part C ("Selecting Charges"), U.S. ATTrORNEYS' MANUAL §§ 9-27.000-9-27.760 (1977),
discussed in Vorenberg, supra note 4, at 1543-44. See also Hutcherson v. United States, 345 F.2d
964 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (Bazelon, J., dissenting, relying on and quoting U.S. Attorneys' Manual guide-
lines). See generally Abrams, supra note 55.
143. See ABA STANDARDS ON THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION, Std. 3-25 (1971) (prosecutor
should develop statement of policies and procedures to guide discretion); Note, supra note 132, at




The efficacy of such self-imposed guidelines in limiting discretion has been
questioned, 144 mainly because the guidelines are non-binding.
145
The fourth limit on the prosecutor's charging discretion is the political
pressure to make popular or at least tolerable charging decisions.146 This
pressure is imposed by the general population through its voting right. 147
Of these four limits, internal guidelines and political pressure on the
prosecutor may operate in a given case either to preclude, or to compel,
prosecution. In contrast, the requirement of a criminal statute, and the
existence of funding limits, would operate only to prohibit a prosecution,
never to compel one.
b. Limits on Prosecutorial Discretion Imposed by the Courts
There are four limits on the prosecutor's charging discretion which de-
pend for their enforcement on the courts. The initial limit on the prosecu-
tor's charging discretion is the requirement that there be sufficient evidence
to charge a crime. 148 The criminal justice system contemplates that the
prosecutor's charging decision is screened at least once for sufficiency of the
evidence before trial. 149 If the charging instrument is an indictment, this
screening is performed by a grand jury' 50 when the indictment is issued or
144. See Vorenberg, supra note 4, at 1545:
Self-imposed limits on discretion may have greater force than either their detractors or
creators realize. As they acquire greater visibility, they may become part of the popular
climate and professional culture in which prosecutors work. In the end, however, such
limits are likely to be no stronger than the determination of the men and women who abide
by them to limit their own discretion. Human nature being what it is, people rarely give up
power voluntarily, and thus the capacity of self-regulation to remove prosecutorial abuse
and arbitrariness from the criminal justice system is limited.
See also id. at 1573:
This power has devolved on the prosecutors by default. Like most of us, they tend to
have confidence in their own judgment, competence, and fairness, and, as most of us
would, they have hung onto their power. Some prosecutors currently may make minor
concessions in the form of nonbinding statements of policy, but if a balance of control over
criminal administration by the prosecutor and by other agencies is to be achieved, change
will almost certainly require reform from outside the prosecutorial ranks.
145. See, eg., U.S. DEP'T OF JusTIcE, supra note 6, Part A.5 ("The principles set forth herein
... are intended solely for the guidance of attorneys for the government. They are not intended to,
do not and may not be relief upon to create a right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable
at law by a party to litigation with the United States.")
146. See Milliken v. Stone, 7 F.2d 397, 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1925) (remedy for U.S. Attorney's refusal
to prosecute is with executive and ultimately with people); State v. Clark, 47 Or. App. 389, 615 P.2d
1043 (1980) (district attorney answers to electorate), aff'd, 630 P.2d 810 (Ore. 1981). See also
NAT'L JUDICIAL COLLEGE, supra note 6, Issue II.B.(l).
147. State prosecutors are generally elected, so this limit operates directly on them. Federal
prosecutors are appointed by the President so they are affected by political pressure only indirectly.
148. See State v. Darden, 171 Conn. 677, 372 A.2d 99, 102 (1976) (discretion and power of
state's attorney limited "in usual and lawful manner by the facts which the prosecutor may be rea-
sonably expected to prove at trial."); State v. Lee, 87 Wash. 2d 932, 934, 588 P.2d 236, 237-38
(Wash. 1976) (decision to prosecute must be based on prosecutor's ability to meet the proof required
by the statute). See generally Vorenberg, supra note 4, at 1537.
149. See generally Vorenberg, supra note 4, at 1537.
150. The screening function performed by the grand jury is included here as a "court enforced"
limit because when the grand jury acts to screen indictments for sufficiency of the evidence rather
than to investigate crime, the grand jury functions more as an arm of the court rather than a
prosecutorial entity. However, the controversy on defining the theoretical and actual role of the
grand jury is beyond the scope of this Article, and no view on this issue is intended by the inclusion
of grand jury screening as a "court enforced" limit.
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refused;151 if the charging instrument is an information, the screening is
done by the court at a preliminary hearing.' 5 2 This control on charging
discretion is reiterated in ethical standards which provide that it is unethical
for the prosecutor to institute criminal proceedings in the absence of prob-
able cause. 153 Other recognized charging guidelines echo this requirement
that the evidence reach a certain level before charges are filed. 154 Disagree-
ment exists as to the efficacy of this evidence requirement as a limitation on
charging discretion.'
55
The second limit on the prosecutor's charging discretion is constitu-
tional.156 Selective prosecution is well-accepted,157 but the selection cannot
deliberately be based upon "an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion,
or other arbitrary classification."' 158 Such discriminatory enforcement is un-
constitutional as a denial of equal protection.' 59 Thus, where laundries op-
151. For example, in the federal system, all felonies must be prosecuted by indictment. U.S.
CoNsT. amend. V. So if the U.S. Attorney presents a case to the grand jury with a recommended
charge which it refuses, the prosecutor's charging decision has been limited by the grand jury. How-
ever, the limit does not apply in reverse; even if the grand jury issues an indictment, the prosecutor is
not required to pursue it. See United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1965), discussed infra
note 173.
152. See F. R. CR. P. 5(a) (screening by judiciary for showing of probable cause). See also
Manning v. Municipal Court, 372 Mass. 315, 361 N.E.2d 1274 (1977) (complaint dismissed for
failure to establish probable cause); Commonwealth v. Malloy, 304 Pa. Super. 297, 450 A.2d 689
(1982) (informations dismissed for failure to establish prima facie case).
153. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY D.R. 7-103(A) (1982).
154. See ABA STANDARDS ON THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION, Std. 3-3.9(a) (1971) (unprofes-
sional for prosecutor to institute criminal charges when it is known the charges are not supported by
probable cause). The U.S. Dep't of Justice, Principles of Federal Prosecution require that sufficient
evidence exist before discretionary issues are considered, see U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 6, at
Part B.l.(b) (if attorney for the government has probable cause to believe a person committed a
federal offense, he should consider whether to commence prosecution).
155. Compare LaFave, supra note 59, at 538 (reasonably effective controls exist to ensure no
prosecutions are begun based upon less than sufficient evidence) with Vorenberg, supra note 4, at
1556 ("[Ihe grand jury and preliminary hearing do not significantly limit the prosecutor's
control.").
156. The existence of constitutional limits on the prosecutor's charging discretion is readily rec-
ognized by the courts. See, ag., United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 125 (1979) ("Selectivity
in the enforcement of criminal laws is, of course, subject to constitutional constraints.");
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 366 (1978) ("And broad though [the prosecutor's] discretion
may be, there are undoubtedly constitutional limits on its exercise."); United States v. Johnson, 577
F.2d 1304, 1308 (5th Cir. 1978) ("The concept that the Constitution limits the prosecutor's discre-
tion is not new to our jurisprudence."); State v. Clark, 291 Or. 231, 245, 630 P.2d 810, 819 (1981)
(discretion of district attorney held to constitutional limits).
157. Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962) (government is permitted "the conscious exercise
of some selectivity" in enforcement of the criminal laws); United States v. Taylor, 693 F.2d 919 (9th
Cir. 1982) (selective enforcement of failing to register for draft upheld); United States v. Torquato,
602 F.2d 564, 568-70 (3d Cir. 1979); Johnson, 577 F.2d at 1308-09; United States v. Shober, 489 F.
Supp. 393, 405 (E.D. Pa. 1979); State v. Lee, 87 Wash. 2d 932, 936-37, 558 P.2d 236, 239 (1976)
(selective enforcement of habitual criminal statute upheld); Note, supra note 132, at 524 ("The
power of the District Attorney to selectively prosecute individuals and groups has not been signifi-
cantly limited by the judiciary.").
158. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985); Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 449, 456 (1962).
159. Batchelder, 442 U.S. at 124; Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 449 (1962); United States v. Torquato,
602 F.2d 564 (3rd Cir. 1979); United States v. Johnson, 577 F.2d 1304 (5th Cir. 1978); United States
v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207, 1211 (2d Cir. 1974) (describing two elements of a discriminatory prosecu-
tion claim); Ward v. State, 414 A.2d 499 (Del. 1980); People v. Walker, 252 N.Y.S.2d 96, 200
N.E.2d 779 (1964); State v. Spicer, 299 N.C. 309, 261 S.E.2d 893 (1980); State v. Clark, 47 Or. App.




erated by Caucasians were granted licenses but laundries operated by Asians
were denied licenses on the basis of race, a Chinese launderer's conviction
for operating without a license was reversed. 160 This limit is well recognized
by the courts,1 61 but it is not well used; prosecutors' charging decisions are
rarely reversed on this basis.
1 62
The third limit imposed on the prosecutor's charging discretion is also
constitutional. This limit is often referred to as a ban on "prosecutorial vin-
dictiveness"' 63 or "retaliatory prosecution."' 164 Specifically, a prosecutor
cannot use the charging power to penalize a defendant for exercising consti-
tutional rights; such retaliation violates due process guarantees. 165 Thus,
where a prosecutor added six counts to a ten count indictment after the
defendant opposed the state's motions for joinder of charges and revocation
of bond, the court dismissed the extra six counts.'
66
The fourth limit on charging discretion is the prosecutor's duty to act
ethically and in good faith. 167 Courts indulge a presumption that prosecu-
160. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
161. See cases cited supra note 157.
162. See Vorenberg, supra note 4, at 1539-41 & n.71 (Yick Wo was "first and last time" the
United States Supreme Court struck down a prosecution for invalid selection of a target; Supreme
Court opinions "have generated an almost unbroken line of cases upholding prosecutors' powers to
decide who and how to charge."). See also Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985) (refusing to
dismiss prosecution on equal protection grounds for failure to show discriminatory purpose).
163. See, eg., Thigpen v. Roberts, 468 U.S. 27 (1984); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27
(1974); Jackson v. Walker, 585 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1978); In re Grand Jury of the Southern District
of Alabama, 508 F. Supp. 1210, 1214 (S.D. Ala. 1980).
164. Vorenberg, supra note 4, at 1541.
165. Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974) (due process violation where defendant who was
convicted on misdemeanor charges and took successful appeal was reindicted on felony charges);
United States v. Motley, 655 F.2d 186, 188-90 (9th Cir. 1981) (prosecution on more serious charges
after defendant successfully moves for mistrial violates due process); Jackson v. Walker, 585 F.2d
139 (5th Cir. 1978); In re Grand Jury of the Southern District of Alabama, 508 F. Supp. 1210, 1214
(S.D. Ala. 1980); State v. Selva, 444 N.E.2d 329 (Ind. App. 1983); Worthington v. State, 409 N.E.2d
1261, 1269 (Ind. App. 1980) (prophylactic rule limits prosecutorial discretion in "seeking new in-
dictments or in conducting retrials when such actions carry with them the opportunity of retaliation
for a defendant's exercise of a statutory right that has due process implications."). See generally
Vorenberg, supra note 4, at 1541-42.
In United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368 (1982), the prosecutorial vindictiveness doctrine was
limited to apply a presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness only to changes in charging decisions
made after an initial trial. The Court's rationale was that at the pretrial stage, vindictiveness was
very unlikely, and at that early stage, the prosecutor should remain free to use broad discretion. The
prosecutorial vindictiveness doctrine still applies to limit charging decisions at the pretrial stage, but
at that stage there is no presumption of vindictiveness as there is with post-trial charging decisions.
166. State v. Selva, 444 N.E.2d 329 (Ind. App. 1983).
167. See, eg., MacDonald v. Musick, 425 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1970). MacDonald was initially
charged with drunk driving. The prosecution filed a motion to dismiss the charge, but when Mac-
Donald refused to stipulate that probable cause for the charge existed, the prosecution withdrew its
motion to dismiss the drunk driving charge and added a charge of resisting arrest. At trial, Mac-
Donald was acquitted of drunk driving but convicted of resisting arrest, and he filed a petition for
habeas corpus. The court granted habeas corpus on the basis that MacDonald's custody was uncon-
stitutional because the state had interfered with MacDonald's federal civil rights claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1979) when it threatened to and did revive the resisting arrest charge. The actual
reading of this case is similar to the "vindictiveness" cases discussed supra in text accompanying
notes 163-66, in that the defendant was penalized in the charging decision for exercising a constitu-
tional right, but on the way to this conclusion, the court commented that the prosecutor's charging
decision was "improper" under ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY D.R. 7-105 (1982),
which provides that it is unethical to threaten criminal action to procure advantage in a civil case.
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tions are undertaken in good faith, 168 but, if a party can produce evidence of
overreaching or bad faith, courts are willing to review the charging deci-
sion. 169 The impact of this limit is slight because no decisions are reported
wherein the charging decision was reversed on this basis.170
Thus, the courts are willing to limit charging discretion only if the pros-
MacDonald, 425 F.2d at 376. See also Commonwealth v. Dunlap, 477 Pa. 155, 160, 377 A.2d 975,
978 (Pa. 1977) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
Another case mentioning the prosecutor's duty to charge ethically and in good faith is Boyd v.
United States, 345 F. Supp. 790 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). The plaintiffs sued, inter alia, the U.S. Attorney
General and Department of Justice for constitutional and statutory violations in entering into a
consent agreement regarding fair housing violations of a particular realtor. The court noted that "It
is hardly necessary to add that the doctrine of prosecutorial discretion has never insulated conduct
from review on charges of bad faith, fraud or illegality." Id. at 793. The court then stated that
despite the plaintiffs' "valid premise," there was no bad faith or collusion in this case, and the com-
plaint was dismissed for failure to state a claim. Id. See also Sinclair v. State, 278 Md. 243, 363
A,2d 468 (1976) (decision to prosecute must "be in accord with the fair and impartial administration
of justice, untainted by any contaminating influence.").
Sometimes the initial charge which is allegedly unethical is part of a plea bargain. See United
States v. Crisona, 440 F. Supp. 24 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), wherein the defendant was not charged until 26
months after the alleged crime. The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, alleging a violation
of due process because the prosecution used the potential charge to try to persuade the defendant to
cooperate in an unrelated action. The court found the delay did not violate due process because the
defendant established no prejudice. Id. at 26. The court also noted, however, that the motion to
dismiss the indictment was "legally inadequate" because bartering an incipient criminal charge for
cooperation in other matters was not necessarily "misbehavior." The court stated:
It is within the sound discretion of the United States Attorney to determine which cases
shall be brought against which defendants; in the absence of overreaching or deceit (which
is not here averred), it is an entirely proper use of that discretion to forego a potential
prosecution where, in the opinion of the United States Attorney, an inculpated party's aid
in other matters outweighs the benefits of his prosecution.
Id at 26.
Thus the court recognized that overreaching or deceit are forbidden, but because neither was present
here, the court declined to dismiss the charges.
Similarly, in United States v. Paiva, 294 F. Supp. 742 (D.D.C. 1969), the defendant had an
agreement to cooperate with the government in the prosecution of others in exchange for not being
indicted. The defendant was eventually indicted anyway, and he moved to dismiss the indictment,
alleging that he was the victim of a broken bargain since he had cooperated. The court reviewed the
agreement and dismissed the indictment. The court stated:
All that is held here is that if, after having utilized its discretion to strike bargains with
potential defendants, the Government seeks to avoid those arrangements by using the
courts, its decision so to do will come under scrutiny. If it further appears that the defend-
ant, to his prejudice, performed his part of the agreement while the Government did not,
the indictment may be dismissed.
Id. at 747. Accord, In re Rook, 276 Or. 695, 556 P.2d 1351 (1976) (prosecutor answerable for
unethical conduct in plea bargaining).
168. United States v. Hoover, 727 F.2d 387, 389 (5th Cir. 1984) ("[T]here is a presumption that
a criminal prosecution is undertaken in good faith."); United States v. Saade, 652 F.2d 1126, 1135
(1st Cir. 1981) (referring to the burden of proof necessary to overcome the presumption of good
faith).
169. MacDonald, 425 F.2d at 375-76; Boyd v. United States, 345 F. Supp. 790 (E.D.N.Y. 1972),
quoted supra note 167. Cf. Sebba, The Victim's Role in the Penal Process: A Theoretical Orientation,
30 Am. J. CoMP. L. 217, 221 (1982) (in Israel, complainant denied prosecution may appeal to the
court which will interfere only where prosecutor's discretion was exercised in bad faith or for extra-
neous motives).
170. In MacDonald v. Musick, discussed supra note 167, the court granted relief in the form of
habeas corpus. The court did cite D.R. 7-105 and did state that the charging decision was "im-
proper," but unethical conduct was not the basis for the decision; the court specifically stated:
We are aware, however, that not everything that may happen to a defendant in a state
court is ground for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus by a federal court, no matter how
much we may disapprove. It must appear that the petitioner " * *is in custody in viola-




ecution is unconstitutional, unethical or based on insufficient evidence.
Courts have occasionally implied the existence of other miscellaneous limits
on the prosecutor's charging decision, 171 but the limits discussed above are
the only limits established to date. No general cause of action for abuse of
discretion exists.
172
As this review of the law indicates, court-imposed limits upon
prosecutorial charging discretion are few, and their practical impact is slight.
Moreover, the four limits imposed by the courts operate only to prohibit
prosecution; none operates to cause a court to compel prosecution.'
73
Courts consistently refuse to compel a prosecution on any theory. 174
MacDonald, 425 F.2d at 376 (citations omitted). In Boyd, discussed supra note 167, the court de-
clined to reverse the charges because it found "no bad faith or collusion."
In Crisona and Paiva, the courts reached different results, but as noted supra in note 167, these
are primarily plea bargain cases where the question was the validity of the government's agreement.
171. For example, the criminal law itself has been invoked as a limit on the prosecutor's charg-
ing discretion. See MacDonald v. Musick, 425 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1970) (court implies that prosecu-
tor's charging decision is extortion); Boyd v. United States, 345 F. Supp. 790, 793 (E.D.N.Y. 1972)
(prosecutorial discretion may be reviewed on grounds of fraud or illegality). As noted supra in note
170, both are talk only. The most interesting case illustrating the limiting potential of the criminal
law is People v. Muka, 72 A.D.2d 649, 421 N.Y.S.2d 438 (Sup. Ct. 1979). In that case Muka filed
333 criminal complaints against public officials and demanded that the local district attorney prose-
cute them. When the district attorney declined, Muka effected a citizens arrest of the district attor-
ney for refusal to prosecute. Police then arrested Muka and charged her with unlawful
imprisonment of the district attorney. Muka's defense was that she was legally restraining the dis-
trict attorney because he was under arrest for failure to prosecute. This argument caused the court
to remark that "The mere refusal of a district attorney to prosecute a complaint is not a crime." Id.
at 440.
As to other limits on the charging decision, one court has found it to be an abuse for the
prosecutor to fail to use discretion in deciding whether to fie habitual criminal charges against a
defendant. In State v. Pettitt, 93 Wash. 2d 932, 609 P.2d 1364 (1980), the prosecutor had relied on a
fixed formula in deciding to file habitual criminal charges. The appellate court remanded the case
for resentencing. In other words, the court found that one limit on the prosecutor's charging discre-
tion was that it must be used.
One final limit on charging discretion is that charging decisions cannot be incompetent or a
violation of the prosecutor's oath. If they are, the court may remove the prosecutor from office. See
Hall, supra note 6, at 970-71, and cases discussed therein.
172. Vorenberg, supra note 4, at 1539 (describing "the lack of a judicially recognized basis" to
challenge the prosecutor's charging discretion). But cf State v. Pettitt, 93 Wash. 2d 932, 609 P.2d
1364 (1980), described supra note 171 (abuse of discretion for prosecutor to fail to use discretion).
173. Regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, see, eg., United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th
Cir. 1965). In Cox, the grand jury returned an indictment which the U.S. Attorney refused to sign.
The court held that the signature was, required for the indictment to be valid, but that the U.S.
Attorney had no duty to sign it. Therefore, the U.S. Attorney could effectively reject the indictment
by refusing to sign it. So even though there was sufficient evidence as determined by the grand jury,
the U.S. Attorney was still not compelled by the court to prosecute the case. The court stated, "The
discretionary power of the attorney for the United States in determining whether a prosecution shall
be commenced or maintained may well depend upon matters of policy wholly apart from any ques-
tion of probable cause." Id. at 171. Accord, ABA STANDARDS ON THE PROSEcuTIoN FUNCTION,
Std. 3-3.9 (1971) (prosecutor may decline to prosecute, even though evidence is sufficient, based on
considerations of seven listed factors). But cf State ex reL Forsythe v. Coate, 558 P.2d 647, 649
(Mont. 1976) (if defendant held to answer after preliminary examination and prosecutor decides not
to file information, prosecutor must file a written statement of reasons for not proceeding; if court
rejects reasons, court may direct prosecutor to proceed with case).
174. See Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 379 (2d Cir. 1973)
(federal courts have "uniformly refrained" from compelling prosecution at the instance of a private
person); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1965); Pugach v. Klein, 193 F. Supp. 630, 635
(S.D.N.Y. 1961) ("The court cannot compel [the U.S. Attorney] to prosecute a complaint, or even




Defining Victim Participation as a Right to Consult with the Prosecutor
Considering the current structure of the charging decision, the most
feasible method of incorporating victims in the process is to establish a vic-
tim's right to consult with the prosecutor. This approach can be designed tominimize the drawbacks and maximize the benefits of victim participation
identified above. This right is described below.
a. Right to Consult
The victim could be granted a right to consult 175 with the prosecutor in
a pre-charge conference. 176 There, the victim could express his views on the
charging decision orally177 or in writing. 17 8 While the victim will presuma-
bly not be aware of all the available charges, he or she will, no doubt, have
general views. An expression of such views would be sufficient to exploit the
benefits of victim participation identified above because this general expres-
sion allows the victim to feel like a critical participant in the process. This
feeling benefits the victim, and public confidence in charging decisions is
fostered, thus society also benefits. And, because the process is expeditious,
it will not absorb undue amounts of time and energy. Finally, the generality
of the victim's views does no harm to the victim's interest because the vic-
tim's interest in the substance of the charging decision is protected by consis-
tency with the prosecutor's interests.
The victim's participation right should be limited to a right to consult
with the prosecutor. Therefore, if the prosecutor were to make a charging
decision in conflict with the victim's desires, the victim would have no right
to appeal and challenge the substance of that decision. This limit is impor-
tant for many reasons. First, the significant benefits of victim participation
derive from the process of participation as opposed to any impact the victim
would have on the substance of the charging decision. Once the victim is
incorporated into the process, no additional benefits are gained by giving the
victim rights in the substance of the decision. Actually, giving the victim a
right to challenge the substance of the charging decision has important
drawbacks: Such a right would inhibit the prosecutor's discretion. The
many benefits of broad charging discretion have been examined, 179 and it is
foolish to risk those benefits by giving victims a right to challenge the prose-
cutor's charging decision.
On a more practical level, there is currently no limit on the prosecutor's
175. A lesser right would be a victim's right to information-to be informed of the charging
decision. See supra note 5. While victims might appreciate this right, it would serve none of the
interests served by participation.
176. See Goldstein, supra note 6, at 515 n.88.
177. Oral expression would involve a meeting or telephone conference between the victim and
prosecutor.
178. Written expression could take the form of a letter to the prosecutor. The mechanics of the
consultation could be arranged so that the victim was notified in a letter from the prosecutor's office
of the right to consult with the prosecutor. The letter should inform the victim that the consultation
may be by personal conference, by telephone or by letter at the victim's option. The letter notifying
the victim of these options should also contain a date after which it will be presumed the victim has
waived the consultation right.
179. See supra text accompanying notes 54-62 and 66-68.
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discretion which might be used to support a victim's challenge of the charg-
ing decision. None of the current limits on prosecutorial discretion would
apply. Nor, for several reasons, are limits imposed by the courts available.
Courts are generally reluctant to review the charging decision at all. In ad-
dition, when it is the victim seeking the prosecution, courts deny victims
standing to challenge the charging decision. Finally, where courts have re-
viewed the decision, they refuse to grant victims the order compelling prose-
cution they seek. Although courts have occasionally entered orders
prohibiting prosecution, they uniformly refuse to compel prosecution. Be-
cause victims generally seek to compel prosecution, they will be denied re-
lief. Formidable barriers preclude use of the courts as an enforcement tool
for the victim's remedy.
Similarly, the limits on prosecutors' charging discretion imposed from
sources other than the courts are poor vehicles for a victim's remedy. Of the
four limits identified above, only two limits, internal guidelines and political
pressure, would be available to compel prosecution. These two limits have
other drawbacks. Internal guidelines are not binding and political pressure
is dependent on too many unpredictable variables such as the temporal prox-
imity of an election, adequate publicity, the existence of competition for the
office, and the impact of other issues in the campaign.180 Thus, a drastic
change in the law would be required before victims could find a method to
implement a challenge to the substance of the charging decision.
Finally, victims should have no right to challenge the substance of the
prosecutor's decision because such a right would consume too much time.
This is exactly the kind of costly impact that would tip the balance against a
victims' participation right at all. Because the benefits of participation are
marginal, time and effort absorbed in implementating the participation must
be negligible or the right should be denied.
b. Remedy for Denial of Right to Consult
Currently, victim participation in the charging decision is discretionary
with the prosecutor. If consultation with the prosecutor is redefined as a
right of the victim, there must be a remedy for denial of the right. Two
possible remedies to secure the right are examined.
If the victim were given a right to consult the prosecutor, the effect
would be to impose a duty on the prosecutor to consult the victim before
making the charging decision. One approach to a remedy would be to define
the prosecutor's duty to consult with the victim as an ethical duty.181 If the
180. But see U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 6, Issue II.B.(l).
181. The ethical duty could be imposed by the state supreme court. Both the Model Rules and
the Code of Professional Responsibility already include special provisions relating to prosecutors.
See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8 (1983); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY D.R. 7-103 (1980). The state supreme court could merely add a new section to
these provisions which would impose a duty on the prosecutor to consult with the victim before
making the charging decision.
Alternatively, the legislature could adopt a statute imposing an ethical duty on prosecutors to
consult with victims before making the charging decision. If the legislature was reluctant to take this
approach because of the inherent power doctrine, the legislature could instead adopt a statute impos-
ing on prosecutors not an ethical duty per se but rather a plain statutory duty. The ethics codes
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prosecutor failed to discharge this duty by consulting with the victim, the
victim's remedy would be to report the failure to the appropriate disciplinary
body which could then take normal steps to handle ethical violations. This
sanction would provide no relief to the particular victim not consulted, but
should be sufficient to deter prosecutors from ignoring victims.
A second approach would be to define a charging decision made with-
out victim consultation as an abuse of discretion by the prosecutor and give
the victim a cause of action. The victim could file an action alleging that the
prosecutor abused his or her discretion by not consulting with the victim. If
such an abuse had occurred and the case had not progressed beyond the
point where charges could be amended, the court could enforce the victim's
right to be consulted. But, the victim would still have no right to challenge
the substance of the final decision as an abuse of discretion.
There is a significant drawback to this latter approach. The drawback
is that the law would have to be changed dramatically because no cause of
action for abuse of discretion in the charging decision exists.' 82 Although
some commentators have lately endorsed review of the charging decision on
an abuse of discretion standard, 183 courts seem disinclined to implement it.
They continue to resist review of the charging decision. 184 As a new cause of
action which the courts are reluctant to establish, this remedy would require
too many difficult and dramatic changes in the law to be attractive. Such a
radical change, to establish a remedy for a right which on balance is only
marginally attractive, would tip the balance against the victims' right to par-
ticipate in the charging decision.
CONCLUSION
The interests of the victim, the defendant, the prosecutor, and society in
the charging decision indicate that the case for victim participation is a close
one. The benefits of victim participation in charging include the victim's
feeling of being a part of the criminal justice process. Another benefit is that
public confidence in charging decisions is bolstered by knowledge of victim
participation in the process. The detriments of participation are that the
process is slowed, and that the possibility of inconsistency in charging deci-
sions is increased. Any participation right must be formulated with these
pros and cons in mind. The main benefits of victim participation derive from
the process of participation as opposed to any impact the participation
would have on the substance of the decision. Therefore, the victim should be
accorded a right to be heard, but the victim should have no right to deter-
mine the substance of the charging decision. Defining the participation right
already require that prosecutors comply with the law, so noncompliance with the law as defined in
the statute would amount to an ethical violation. If a court reviewed the statute and found it to be a
violation of the inherent powers doctrine but was persuaded that the substance of the statute was
valuable, the court could decide to impose the ethical obligation itself. On the other hand, if the
court found the statute to be a violation of the inherent powers doctrine and further disagreed that a
duty to consult with victims should be imposed, the court would have the last word and no victims'
consultation right could be enacted.
182. See supra text accompanying note 172.
183. See, eg., Note, supra note 51.
184. See, eg., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985).
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within this limit exploits the benefits of victim participation because victims
feel they have had their say and thus victim alienation is minimized. More-
over, a right to participate in the process, but not to challenge the substance,
minimizes the danger of inconsistency in charging decisions as a result of
victim participation because it denies the victim undue influence upon the
substance of the decision. Finally, the defined consultation right is simple
and expeditious and therefore minimizes the time consumed. A consultation
right defined in this way succeeds in exploiting the benefits and defeating the
drawbacks of victim participation.
One final point about victim participation is important. Where victims
in a particular jurisdiction have been granted a right to participate in sen-
tencing and plea bargaining, the case for a right to participate in the charg-
ing decision is strengthened in the name of consistency. In jurisdictions that
have made the decision to grant victims a participation right at other stages,
victim participation in the charging decision is consistent with the current
structure and would contribute to a coherent system.
Victims have recently been the focus of media and scholarly atten-
tion.1 85 Often the concern expressed is that victims are unfairly ignored by
the criminal justice system. 186 The law cannot afford to ignore popular sen-
timent and intuitive notions of justice without risking credibility and effi-
cacy. Of course, if popular sentiment calls for the violation of rights, the
role of the law is to control that inclination. But, the victim's participation
right defined herein creates no danger of infringing upon any legal or moral
right: The ultimate power regarding the substance of charging decisions re-
mains with the prosecutors. Yet several benefits are realized. Structured as
suggested, the victim's right to participate in the charging decision does not
cater to society's baser instincts, nor is it a masquerade to limit defendant's
rights under the guise of concern for victims. Rather, it has social utility.
185. See Booth v. Maryland, 107 S. Ct. 2529, 2542 (1987) ("Recent years have seen an outpour-
ing of popular concern for what has come to be known as victims' rights .... ) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing). See, eg., Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14 (1982); Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982,
96 Stat. 1248 (1982), codified in various sections of Title 18, U.S.C.; President's Task Force, supra
note 5, Final Report. See generally Henderson, supra note 9, at 949-50 (describing the "enormous
political, media, and legal attention" recently devoted to victims' rights).
186. See, eg., Booth, 107 S. Ct. at 2542. ("Recent years have seen an outpouring of popular
concern for what has come to be known as victims' rights .... Many citizens have found one-sided
and hence unjust the criminal trial in which a parade of witnesses comes forth to testify to the
pressures beyond normal human experience that drove the defendant to commit his crime, with no
one to lay before the sentencing authority the full reality of human suffering the defendant has
produced .. ") (Scalia, J., dissenting); Morris, 461 U.S. at 14 ("The court wholly failed to take into
account the interest of the victim .... [1]n the administration of criminal justice, courts may not
ignore the concerns of victims.").
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